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FRAUDULENT CORPORATE SIGNALS: 
CONDUCT AS SECURITIES FRAUD 
Manuel A. Utset* 
Abstract: Paying a dividend, repurchasing shares, underpricing an initial 
public offering, pledging collateral, and borrowing using short-term, in-
stead of long-term debt, are all forms of corporate communications. They 
are “corporate signals” that tell investors certain things about a company’s 
operations and current financial position, and about the managers’ con-
fidence in its future performance. This Article provides the first compre-
hensive analysis of the relationship between corporate signals and securi-
ties fraud. The incentive to communicate using corporate signals has 
increased in recent years, a phenomenon that, I argue, is due to the grow-
ing complexity of public corporations, and, importantly, to a number of 
changes in federal securities laws aimed at better deterring fraud and 
making companies more transparent. The Article makes three major con-
tributions. First, it identifies this deep connection between the use of cor-
porate signals (both truthful and deceptive) and recent changes in secu-
rities laws. Second, it identifies significant social costs associated with 
corporate signaling, which commentators and policymakers have over-
looked: signals can encourage stock bubbles, create costly “signaling 
races,” and lead to the loss of information about companies and indus-
tries. Third, it provides a normative account of how a lawmaker could de-
sign antifraud provisions under the securities laws in order to reduce total 
fraud, instead of simply rechanneling deceptive practices from the realm 
of written and oral statements to that of deceptive corporate signals. 
Introduction 
 The managers of public corporations have great, although not 
complete, control over corporate communications. They control when, 
and how, company-specific, nonpublic information is released to inves-
tors. When managers file disclosure documents with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and make certain oral statements, they 
subject themselves and their companies to the requirements and penal-
ties of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the 1934 Act”),1 and, in 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2013, Manuel A. Utset, Charles W. Ehrhardt Professor, Florida State University 
College of Law. 
1 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a–78pp 
(West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-158)). 
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the case of a public offering, the Securities Act of 1933 (“the 1933 
Act”).2 Oral and written statements are the most common, and best 
understood, type of corporate communication, but they are not the 
only type. Investors also learn by watching: by observing and interpret-
ing the things that companies and their managers do. Knowing this, 
managers will not only choose their actions carefully, but will also high-
light those that they want investors to notice. Paying a dividend, repur-
chasing shares, underpricing an initial public offering (IPO), pledging 
collateral, and borrowing using short-term instead of long-term debt, 
are all forms of corporate communications. These communications are 
“corporate signals” that tell investors certain things about a company’s 
operations and current financial position, and about the manager’s 
confidence in the company’s prospects. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
each of these corporate signals was carefully analyzed by economists 
and legal commentators,3 who theorized that “good” managers and 
companies will often resort to corporate signals to try to distinguish (or 
“separate” themselves) from “bad” managers and companies.4 If taken 
seriously as a positive account of the way that signals are used within 
corporate contexts, this standard signaling theory is, at best, incom-
plete, and, at worst, inaccurate.5 
 In this Article, I argue that managers do use corporate signals as a 
form of communication, but they do so, in many instances, for differ-
ent reasons from the ones set forth in the signaling literature. Rational 
managers will craft corporate communications strategically; they will 
settle on the message that they want investors to hear and will combine 
words and actions, and truths and deceptions, to get that message 
across. In short, managers can commit fraud using deceptive signals, 
                                                                                                                      
2 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a–77aa (West, West-
law through P.L. 112-142)). 
3 See infra notes 25–78 and accompanying text (summarizing the economic and legal 
literature on signaling, in the context of corporate and securities laws). 
4 See infra notes 35–91 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 79–87 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of standard 
signaling theories given evidence from empirical studies). This standard signaling theory 
has also overlooked some important corporate signals, such as executive compensation 
decisions. This Article is part of a larger project examining the role of corporate signals in 
various areas of corporate governance, including executive compensation and state corpo-
rate law. See Manuel A. Utset, Deceptive Signals, Executive Compensation, and Real-Time 
Corporate Governance ( June 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). The 
larger project develops a theory of executive compensation in which compensation deci-
sions are analyzed as corporate signals, and analyzes the use of compensation packages to 
send deceptive signals, both of which help explain why managers in poorly performing 
companies get pay increases (including more options) and why increased disclosure re-
quirements on executive compensation has made matters worse). Id. 
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and not just through their oral and written statements.6 The incentive 
to communicate using corporate signals has increased in recent years, a 
phenomenon that is due to the growing complexity of public corpora-
tions.7 Counterintuitively, this trend is also due to a number of changes 
in federal securities laws aimed at making companies more transparent 
and deterring fraud. In order to reduce the total amount of fraud, 
Congress and the SEC need to take a holistic approach, adopting legal 
rules that simultaneously deal with deceptive verbal statements and de-
ceptive signals. But there is an additional reason why a comprehensive 
analysis of corporate signaling, like the one offered in this Article, is 
needed: the growing use of deceptive and truthful corporate signals has 
created a number of social costs, including fueling stock bubbles, which 
have been overlooked by commentators and policymakers.8 
 Part I summarizes the standard account of corporate signals and 
examines some of its empirical and theoretical limitations.9 Part II de-
scribes the incentives and techniques available to managers to compose 
corporate communications strategically.10 It analyzes the practices of 
message arbitrage (combining signals and verbal statements to reduce 
their impact) and message magnification (combining different types of 
statements to magnify their effect or salience).11 Part II ends by arguing 
that modern Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), who are hired (in part) 
for their ability to craft corporate messages to manage the beliefs of 
                                                                                                                      
6 Although some commentators have mentioned the possibility of fraudulent or false 
signals, they have either concluded that it is unlikely that companies will resort to using 
them extensively, or have examined them only briefly. See Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, 
Jr., Signalling with Dividends, Stock Repurchases, and Equity Issues, 15 Fin. Mgmt. 27, 35 (1986) 
(stating that although “false signaling” is a possibility and may “mislead the market for a 
short time,” managers are deterred from doing so extensively by the market, whose 
“vengeance” —even if delayed— “should be unavoidable”); Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regu-
lating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 Va. L. Rev. 945, 991 n.173 (1991) (mention-
ing the possibility of low-value companies using false signals); Victor Brudney, Dividends, 
Discretion, and Disclosure, 66 Va. L. Rev. 85, 112–14 (1980) (arguing that dividends can be 
vague, confusing, and potentially harmful to shareholders); Daniel R. Fischel, The Law and 
Economics of Dividend Policy, 67 Va. L. Rev. 699, 722–25 (1981) (arguing that the efficiency 
of capital markets and other market constraints, such as the markets for managers and 
takeovers, prevent corporations from using deceptive or vague dividends systematically); 
Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 Va. L. Rev. 
623, 655 (1992) (referring to “fraudulent signals,” but stating that they are poor substitutes 
for more direct forms of communication, such as press releases). 
7 See infra notes 130–141 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 197–228 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 25–91 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 92–142 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 101–141 and accompanying text. 
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consumers, competitors, and regulators, will have an incentive to use 
this same skill to mold the beliefs of investors.12 
 Part III shows that a number of changes in securities laws over the 
last twenty years have had an unintended effect of leading managers 
and investors increasingly to rely on corporate signals, managers to 
communicate with investors, and investors to monitor managers.13 
When deceptive signals are underenforced, as has been the case his-
torically, a manager set on committing fraud will deceive with signals 
first, and with written and oral statements only as a last resort.14 This 
distortion has been further reinforced by Congress’s repeated ratchet-
ing up of sanctions for managers who make false or incomplete written 
and oral disclosures, and by the growing complexity of disclosure 
documents.15 The latter will lead honest managers to turn increasingly 
to corporate signals. Investors face real-time constraints when decipher-
ing corporate communications, and thus will value signals, which are 
easier to interpret quickly.16 
 Finally, current disclosure rules require SEC filings to describe, 
often in great detail, the conduct of companies and their managers.17 
Each of these disclosures will produce a corporate signal, which will be 
salient, if for no other reason than that it is required by law under the 
threat of civil and criminal sanctions. Commentators and policymakers 
have overlooked this deep connection between the recent evolution of 
securities regulation and the increased use of corporate signaling.18 
Identifying and analyzing the existence of this connection helps further 
our understanding of corporate communications. But, it also has im-
                                                                                                                      
12 See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 143–232 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 155–196 and accompanying text. 
15 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West, Westlaw through P.L. 
112-196)). 
16 In order to make an arbitrage profit, an investor needs to interpret corporate com-
munications and execute trades before others do. 
17 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2006) (requiring compa-
nies and managers to file annually reports concerning the scope and adequacy of their 
internal control structures and procedures for financial reporting). 
18 There are a few exceptions, but only regarding the first issue—the relationship be-
tween underenforcement and the incentive to use deceptive signals. See Mahoney, supra 
note 6, at 653–55 (arguing that overenforcement of securities laws may lead, in theory, to 
companies communicating more often through signals, which is a problem because cor-
porate signals are an expensive, coarse form of communication); Asquith & Mullins, supra 
note 6, at 36 (arguing that signals are better tools than verbal disclosures because they 
allow companies to communicate with investors without disclosing sensitive information to 
competitors). 
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portant normative implications. The growing use of corporate signals is 
not benign—even when the signals are truthful. Part III concludes by 
showing that corporate signals can increase the likelihood of stock 
bubbles, wasteful “signaling races,” and the loss of information about 
companies and whole industries.19 
 The arguments developed in Parts II and III underwrite my prin-
cipal normative claim: that a lawmaker whose goal is to minimize the 
amount of total securities fraud at the lowest cost possible needs to 
treat corporate communications holistically, taking into account that 
managers can commit fraud using both words and signals. Part IV de-
velops this claim.20 It first describes how a lawmaker would go about 
designing legal rules holistically, including how she would address the 
shortcomings with current securities regulation identified in Part III.21 
It then argues that a manager or a company that uses deceptive signals 
can violate SEC Rule 10b-5.22 Finally, Part IV provides a new interpreta-
tion of the most controversial corporate governance provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), using the signaling analysis de-
veloped in the Article.23 Part IV concludes by raising and addressing 
some possible objections to regulating corporate signals using federal 
securities laws.24 
I. Signaling and Corporate Finance 
 When an investor decides to purchase or sell a company’s security, 
it will not have access to two types of information that would help it to 
better value that security: (1) inside information, which resides within 
the company and is under the control of its managers, and (2) market 
information, which resides in the hands of the company’s competitors 
and the investor’s own competitors—other traders. This Article focuses 
on inside information—particularly, how and when it gets revealed to 
investors, and what investors do with it.25 A corporation communicates 
                                                                                                                      
 
19 See infra notes 197–232 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 233–357 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 243–284 and accompanying text. 
22 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012); see infra notes 285–320 and accompanying text. 
23 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-196)); 
see infra notes 321–351 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 352–357 and accompanying text. 
25 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law 297–98 (1991) (arguing that sophisticated investors will analyze and 
properly incorporate information into market price, freeing unsophisticated investors 
from having to analyze information); Susanna Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Pre-
650 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:645 
with third parties by transmitting information through the words and 
conduct of its authorized agents,26 such as the board of directors,27 ex-
ecutives,28 corporate counsel,29 and accountants.30 These corporate 
“statements” are distinct from those made by agents acting on their 
own behalf.31 But distinguishing between the two types of statements is 
                                                                                                                      
 
cautions: Conveying Cautionary Warnings in Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, 2005 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 929, 972–73 (discussing the role of professional traders in analyzing and properly 
discounting corporate disclosures). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s 
About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 Bus. Law. 1403, 1404–05 (2002) (arguing that professional 
gatekeepers, such as securities analysts and auditors, failed to properly “filter, verify and 
assess [Enron’s] complicated financial information”); Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of 
Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1089, 1106 (2007) (arguing that ad-
vances in technology have encouraged investors to analyze disclosures on their own and 
rely less on the expertise of professional analysts, which in turn has undermined the over-
all effectiveness of corporate disclosures). 
26 Messages communicated by words are themselves actions, and thus can be used as 
signals; their structure, context, and timing can all provide a second-order gloss on the 
underlying verbal message. See J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words 94–109 ( J. 
O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975) (developing the distinction between utter-
ances that transfer meaning in a usual manner, and performatives: utterances that are 
themselves a type of action, such as saying “I do” in a marriage ceremony). Legal scholars 
concerned with the distinction between words and conduct, as applied in areas such as the 
First Amendment, criminal law, and contracts, have been influenced by British philoso-
pher J.L. Austin’s performatives analysis. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and 
the Uses of Language 57–63 (1989) (discussing speech as conduct and developing the 
concept of situation-altering speech); B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: 
Ceremonial Deism and Change in Meaning Over Time, 59 Duke L.J. 705, 733–36 (2010) (dis-
cussing Austin’s performatives in the context of the Establishment Clause); Jonathan 
Yovel, What Is Contract Law “About”? Speech Act Theory and a Critique of “Skeletal Promises,” 94 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 937, 939–44 (2000) (discussing promises and other contract law issues 
while taking into account Austin’s theory of performative language). 
27 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2009) (stating that corporations “shall be man-
aged by or under the direction of a board of directors”). 
28 See id. § 142(a) (stating that corporations “shall have such officers with such titles 
and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors . . . 
and as may be necessary to enable it to sign instruments and stock certificates”). 
29 Because of attorney-client privilege, corporate counsel is more likely to “speak” with 
actions (signals), such as withdrawing from representing a client, than with words. See 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.16(a) (1983) (requiring a lawyer to withdraw from 
representing a client to the extent that representation will lead to a violation of the law or 
of the rules of professional conduct). 
30 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(a) (West, Westlaw 
through P.L. 112-158) (setting forth periodic reporting requirements, which necessarily 
involve statements by internal accountants regarding the financial state of the company, 
for any company issuing securities). 
31 For example, an executive may sell company shares in her portfolio, which may send 
a signal about her confidence in the company’s future performance. If the sales trigger 
application of section 16(a) of the 1934 Act, the executive will have to make those sales 
public by filing a report with the SEC. It is the publicity of the executive’s action that turns 
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difficult;32 managers will often have interests that diverge from those of 
shareholders, and thus the corporation.33 If the conduct is within a 
context in which self-dealing is a true possibility, an investor will have to 
determine the extent to which a manager is engaged in deceptive sig-
naling on her own behalf, and interpret the signal accordingly.34 But, 
conduct by a manager on the company’s behalf will, at a minimum, re-
veal information about the company. It may also reveal the manager’s 
beliefs about the company’s future prospects, but only, of course, to the 
extent that investors can observe those actions or learn about them, 
either indirectly through a third party (such as a stock analyst) or di-
rectly from the company’s disclosure documents. Corporate conduct, 
therefore, will be the basis of signaling theories. 
 Section A examines the standard signaling theory and discusses 
the signals associated with the underpricing of IPOs, dividends, stock 
repurchases, short-term debt, the pledging of collateral, and the use of 
third-party certifiers such as underwriters, auditors, and rating agen-
cies. Section B discusses some of the limitations of the standard signal-
ing account. 
A. The Standard Signaling Account 
 Signals, according to standard economic theory, are most valuable 
when words are cheap and conduct is costly.35 Words are cheap when a 
corporation or manager can lie with impunity, without having to bear 
                                                                                                                      
her conduct into a signal on which investors may act. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
§ 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
32 A company and its managers can be seen as part of a “team.” When teams engage in 
joint behavior, third parties will often find it difficult to determine the relative contribu-
tion of each team member. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory 
of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 265–69 (1999) (discussing the problem of providing 
incentives within teams, given the difficulty of determining the relative contribution of 
each participant). 
33 See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property 5–6 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932) (describing the separation of 
ownership and control in a public corporation, in which managers exercise effective con-
trol even though the shareholders are the firm’s true owners); Michael C. Jensen & Wil-
liam H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
ture, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308–10 (1976) (setting forth a general theory that agency costs in 
firms are due to the informational asymmetry problems between managers and share-
holders). 
34 See infra notes 148–149 and accompanying text (developing the context of deceptive 
signaling). A manager may also engage in deceptive signaling on behalf of the company. 
35 See Jean Tirole, The Theory of Corporate Finance 249 (2006). 
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the costs of legal sanctions or loss of reputation.36 In such a world, in-
vestors would not be able to tell who is telling the truth and who is ly-
ing.37 Signals are cheap when actors can send them at little or no cost. 
Investors expect that managers of “bad” companies will lie to keep 
negative information from them, and those of “good” companies will 
tell the truth and reveal positive information.38 The problem is that 
investors do not know which type of company they are dealing with.39 
When an investor is unsure, it will discount to account for this risk.40 If 
it is willing to pay $100 for a good company and $50 for a bad one, it 
will average it out and offer to pay $75.41 
 Good companies may refuse to sell their securities at this lower 
price, and if they do sell, they will cross-subsidize the bad companies.42 
                                                                                                                      
 
36 See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Mar-
kets, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781, 786 (2001) (arguing that it is difficult to deliver credible infor-
mation to investors, particularly for companies that have not yet developed a valuable 
reputation that they want to preserve); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Stan-
dards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253, 281 (2003) (arguing that when companies lie to consumers, 
the costs of lying, if they materialize at all, are often delayed). Sometimes, increasing the 
sanctions for a particular offense can have the unintended side effect of encouraging lying 
and destruction of evidence. See Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1331, 1368–69 (2006). 
37 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1487, 1497 (1996) (arguing that misrepresentation and fraud create social costs be-
cause they increase the cost of raising capital for honest companies). 
38 Even when public companies are subject to mandatory disclosure requirements, 
managers will have an incentive to lie whenever the expected benefits from lying exceed 
the expected sanctions, which depend on the level of enforcement by private actors and 
the SEC. See Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 Duke L.J. 511, 518 (2011) (stat-
ing that securities fraud is likely underenforced); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. Econ. Literature 45, 47 (2000) (ar-
guing that a person will violate the law if and only if the expected utility from doing so, 
taking into account the expected benefits and possibility of sanctions, exceeds the utility 
from obeying the law). 
39 See Tirole, supra note 35, at 249–50. 
40 See id. 
41 This problem assumes that the investor believes that it is equally likely to draw a good 
or a bad company. This sort of informational asymmetry problem, arising at the time when 
parties are thinking about entering into a transaction, is referred to as the adverse selection 
or “market for lemons” problem. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Un-
certainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488, 489–90 (1970) (setting forth the stan-
dard treatment of adverse selection problems in the context of used car dealers, which have 
an informational advantage over potential purchasers of “lemons”). 
42 See Tirole, supra note 35, at 242–44 (discussing the circumstances under which a 
good firm will agree to cross-subsidize and those in which it will abandon trying to raise 
external funds to finance a project). Given the adverse selection problem, when deciding 
how to finance a project, companies will often resort to a pecking order—first relying on 
internal financing, then on debt, and finally on equity. Debt is preferred to equity since it 
has priority. See Stewart C. Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39 J. Fin. 575, 581–82 (1984) 
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Good companies will, therefore, try to identify expensive signals— 
courses of action that are too costly for bad companies to undertake.43 
If one exists, they will incur the cost of sending the signal, with the ex-
pectation that the bad companies will not follow suit; thus, an investor 
who observes the companies’ behavior will be able to tell the good 
from the bad.44 Conversely, if a good company cannot find a suitably 
expensive signal, it will be pooled with the bad ones and suffer a dis-
count at the hands of investors. 
 Investors often react positively or negatively to a number of corpo-
rate actions that, under standard finance theory, should not lead to any 
change in the company’s market price. One way to explain these inves-
tor reactions is to posit that the observed conduct reveals nonpublic 
information, or equivalently, it is being used by good companies to sig-
nal to the market. This is the basic idea behind the signaling theories to 
which we now turn. 
1. Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings 
 One long-standing puzzle in corporate finance is why IPOs are of-
ten underpriced. A company’s stock price will often increase signifi-
cantly on the first day of trading.45 Why would a company leave money 
on the table in this fashion? One explanation is that underpricing acts 
as a signal of quality.46 At the time of an IPO, potential investors know 
very little about the company, particularly compared to insiders such as 
founders, employees who own shares, and venture capitalists.47 By un-
                                                                                                                      
 
(laying out the pecking order theory). Thus, all other things being equal, a debt holder 
who invests in an overvalued firm is harmed less than an equity holder. See id. 
43 See Tirole, supra note 35, at 249. 
44 See id. at 249–50 (arguing that to separate itself effectively from bad companies, a 
good company must offer investors contractual terms that bad companies would find un-
appealing); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. Econ. 355, 356–61 (1973) (devel-
oping a signaling theory in which separation between good and bad actors requires that 
the former have a course of action available that is too expensive for the latter to mimic). 
45 The stock price is often materially underpriced. See Alexander Ljungqvist, IPO Un-
derpricing: A Survey, in 1 Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Fi-
nance 375, 378 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) (stating that since the 1960s, the amount of 
underpricing—the underpricing discount—has averaged approximately 19%, and reached 
approximately 40% during the Internet bubble that burst in 2001). 
46 See Mark Grinblatt & Chuan Yang Hwang, Signalling and the Pricing of New Issues, 44 J. 
Fin. 393, 394 (1989) (describing the underpricing signaling model, in which insiders re-
tain some of the shares in their portfolio, and noting that the greater the number of shares 
retained, the stronger the signal); Ljungqvist, supra note 45, at 400–02 (summarizing un-
derpricing signaling theories and empirical studies testing these theories). 
47 Venture capitalists have access to nonpublic information, and they structure their 
infusions of capital so that they occur in stages, which allows them to reduce their informa-
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derpricing the IPO, a company increases the likelihood that it will need 
to raise additional funds in the future by issuing debt securities or more 
equity, which would expose them to further scrutiny.48 A good com-
pany is not worried about this future scrutiny, but a bad one will want 
to price its IPO as high as possible and avoid having to tap the capital 
markets again.49 As a result, underpricing can be explained in part as 
an attempt by good companies to send a credible signal to investors.50 
 Insiders will usually sell some of their shares during the IPO. In-
siders of good companies can further reinforce the underpricing signal 
by selling few of their own shares during the initial offering; this will 
reveal that they know the offering is underpriced and that they believe 
the company will continue to perform well, allowing them to cash in 
later when its value has increased further.51 Insiders of bad firms, on 
the other hand, will not underprice the offering because they want to 
cash in their investment before the market discovers the company’s 
poor financial state.52 
2. Dividend Payments 
 Studies of corporate dividend policies have consistently found two 
things: stock prices go up when companies increase their dividends, 
and go down when companies decrease their dividends.53 This is puz-
zling from a purely corporate finance perspective: under Merton H. 
Miller and Franco Modigliani’s dividend irrelevance hypothesis, paying 
a dividend or changing an existing dividend should have no effect on 
the company’s value, and thus should not affect the price at which its 
                                                                                                                      
tional risk. See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of 
Venture Capitalists, 49 J. Fin. 371, 372 (1994) (discussing the role of staged financing in 
allowing venture capitalists to update information over time); Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, Hands-Tying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt, 
8 J.L. Econ. & Org. 628, 646–47 (1992) (discussing information updating after venture 
capital investments). 
48 See Ljungqvist, supra note 45, at 400. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 More generally, one way that entrepreneurs signal to outsiders that they are confi-
dent the company will perform well in the future is to continue to hold a large number of 
shares. See Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, 
and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. Fin. 371, 372–77 (1977) (developing a signaling model in 
which the costs to an entrepreneur from not diversifying holdings can signal his or her 
level of confidence in the future cash flows of the project being financed). 
52 See id. 
53 See Avner Kalay & Michael Lemmon, Payout Policy, in 2 Handbook of Corporate 
Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, supra note 45, at 3, 36 (summarizing the evi-
dence for market reactions to companies’ dividend policies). 
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shares are traded.54 One way to resolve this puzzle is to posit that divi-
dends reveal nonpublic information about the company’s current fi-
nancial condition and its manager’s beliefs about its future cash flows. 
A company’s earnings can be paid out as dividends or reinvested in the 
business.55 Paying dividends reduces the amount of free cash flows 
available to managers to deal with liquidity shocks or to finance new 
projects; this, in turn, increases the risk that a company will have to 
forego valuable projects or issue more equity or debt.56 A good com-
pany (and a good manager) is not worried about the added scrutiny if 
it is forced to raise additional capital.57 There is a second way in which 
dividends can act as a signal of a company’s quality. A good company is 
more likely to have a steady stream of good projects to finance than a 
bad one;58 if a bad company does not have the funds to finance a valu-
                                                                                                                      
54 See Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of 
Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411, 414 (1961); see also Fischel, supra note 6, at 701 (explaining the 
Miller and Modigliani hypothesis). 
55 Under state corporate law, the board of directors is authorized to declare dividends, 
but it is not required to do so. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 170(a), 173 (2009) (stating that 
the board of directors is vested with the authority both to declare and to pay dividends); 
United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 140–41 (1972) (stating that the board of directors is 
vested with power to declare dividends at its discretion, and that the board “must balance 
the expectation of stockholders to reasonable dividends when earned against corporate 
needs for retention of earnings”); cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 685 (Mich. 
1919) (holding that the defendant, Ford Motor Company, which had refused to distribute 
funds to stockholders after accumulating a large surplus, had a “duty to distribute . . . a 
very large sum of money to stockholders,” and consequently forcing the defendant to pay 
a dividend). If reinvested, the earnings will produce returns in the future that may be posi-
tive or negative. When managers determine whether to reinvest earnings, they will com-
pare the cost of the project in which they are investing with its discounted expected re-
turns. The predicted returns are doubly discounted—to account for the risk that they will 
not materialize and for the time value of money. Even if these expected returns are posi-
tive, shareholders will still prefer a dividend over reinvestment whenever other uses are 
available for those distributions that will yield a higher expected return, either from other 
investments or from consumption. 
56 To avoid negative information from becoming public, a bad company may try to 
raise funds by selling some of its assets. But this too will bring increased scrutiny from ex-
isting investors, as well as those purchasing the assets. Someone purchasing assets from a 
company in financial distress may worry that the assets are overvalued because the com-
pany has underinvested in taking care of them. 
57 See Sudipto Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and “The Bird in the 
Hand” Fallacy, 10 Bell J. Econ. 259, 260–63 (1979) (developing a dividend signaling the-
ory in which firms precommit to paying dividends, and in which companies with bad pro-
jects are more likely to have negative returns on those projects and incur the costs of rais-
ing new capital). 
58 See Merton H. Miller & Kevin Rock, Dividend Policy Under Asymmetric Information, 40 J. 
Fin. 1031, 1033–37 (1985) (developing a dividend signaling theory in which the relative 
cost to bad companies of paying dividends is greater because they will have to pass up valu-
able projects). 
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able project, when it does materialize, its loss is more momentous than 
that borne by a good company, which can forego some valuable pro-
jects knowing that more are in the pipeline.59 
3. Stock Repurchases 
 Companies will sometimes buy back some of their outstanding 
stock in the open market or by doing a self-tender offer.60 From a 
purely financial perspective, a stock buy-back is equivalent to a divi-
dend: they are both ways of distributing retained earnings to share-
holders,61 and as with dividends, the company’s fundamental value 
does not change.62 Nonetheless, when stock repurchases are an-
nounced, investors tend to react positively, bidding up the stock price.63 
One explanation is that, as with a dividend, stock repurchases act as a 
signal of quality.64 A dividend, however, is a more robust, longer-lived 
signaling mechanism; once a company starts paying a dividend, reduc-
ing or eliminating it will send a strong negative signal to the market.65 
Stock repurchases, alternatively, are episodic—a company may offer a 
                                                                                                                      
59 See id. 
60 See Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 421, 427–34 (2000) (describing various ways in which stock repurchases 
can be carried out and signaling explanations can be attached to each); Kalay & Lemmon, 
supra note 53, at 44 (describing the principal ways of carrying out a stock repurchase: a 
fixed-price self-tender, a Dutch auction, a negotiated transaction, and a transaction on the 
open market). 
61 See Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH Under 
Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 475, 489–90 (1997) (describ-
ing dividends as functionally equivalent to stock repurchases, at least from the perspective 
of distribution of retained earnings to shareholders). 
62 See id. 
63 See Robert Comment & Gregg A. Jarrell, The Relative Signalling Power of Dutch-Auction 
and Fixed-Price Self-Tender Offers and Open-Market Share Repurchases, 46 J. Fin. 1243, 1262–63 
(1991) (finding abnormal returns of 2.3% around the time of announcement); Theo 
Vermaelen, Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signalling: An Empirical Study, 9 J. Fin. 
Econ. 139, 150 (1981) (finding that stock repurchases led to abnormal returns of about 
3% around the time of announcement). 
64 See F.H. Buckley, When the Medium Is the Message: Corporate Buybacks as Signals, 65 Ind. 
L.J. 493, 516, 537–40 (1990); Larry Y. Dann, Common Stock Repurchases: An Analysis of Re-
turns to Bondholders and Stockholders, 9 J. Fin. Econ. 113, 114 (1981); William J. McNally, 
Open Market Stock Repurchase Signaling, 28 Fin. Mgmt. 55, 57–58 (1999). 
65 See Kalay & Lemmon, supra note 53, at 45 (arguing that because of the negative re-
action to dividend cuts, dividends commit managers to continue making payouts, thus 
increasing the robustness of the signal). 
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buyback one year and never do another one without necessarily send-
ing a negative signal.66 
4. Borrowing Decisions as Signals 
 When a company finances its operations using short-term debt, it 
will have to renew its debt agreements with greater regularity than a 
company that relies on long-term debt. If a company’s debt has a six-
month maturity, and, at the end of that period, the company still needs 
the funds, it will need either to get the lender to rollover the loan or to 
renegotiate with a new lender.67 Managers who want to avoid this peri-
odic scrutiny or are afraid that, due to intervening events, they will not 
be able to renew the loan, will prefer debt with a longer maturity. Be-
cause of this, a good manager can signal her confidence in her own 
abilities and the company’s future prospects by borrowing using short-
term debt.68 
 At the time it borrows funds, a company may agree to secure the 
loan by pledging some of its property as collateral. A lender with a se-
curity interest over a company’s property can, in the case of a default, 
foreclose on that interest, take possession of it, and sell it to satisfy all or 
part of the company’s obligations.69 A company may pledge equip-
ment, inventory, accounts receivable, securities in its portfolio, and any 
other property that can be sold if the lender has to exercise its foreclo-
sure rights.70 Upon default, the debtor incurs two losses: (1) the actual 
value of the collateral, and (2) the interruption in its operations from 
not having use of equipment, inventory, and, in the case of a financial 
                                                                                                                      
66 See Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut: Tax Policy as the Handmaiden of 
Budget Policy, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 503, 524–26 (2007) (distinguishing between dividends that 
tend to be “sticky” and costly to eliminate from stock repurchases that are episodic or non-
recurring). 
67 If a company’s original lender fails to rollover the loan, this will send a negative sig-
nal to potential new lenders, who will be afraid that the original lender refused to con-
tinue lending because it had private, negative information. 
68 See George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 305, 317 (2001) (describing short-term debt as a signal that insiders are opti-
mistic of the company’s future). According to a general economic model, short-term debt 
signals a manager’s confidence that she will be able to renew the debt when it becomes 
due. See Douglas W. Diamond, Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk, 106 Q.J. Econ. 709, 
712–16 (1991); see also Tirole, supra note 35, at 254–57 (describing signaling theory using 
short-term debt). 
69 See U.C.C. §§ 9-609, 9-610 (2000) (setting forth a secured party’s right to take posses-
sion and dispose of collateral after default). 
70 See id. § 9-109 (setting forth the scope of the items that can be included in a security 
interest). 
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institution, securities that it can lend to third parties. It is this second-
order loss that underwrites the collateral signal; the greater the poten-
tial interruption to a debtor’s business, the more powerful the signal.71 
5. Certification as a Signal 
 One way of reducing the informational risk faced by investors is for 
the company to hire a third party to analyze the company’s nonpublic, 
inside information. This third party can certify, for example, that the 
company is not overvalued or that its managers are not engaged in 
fraud or other illegal activities.72 Common certifiers include underwrit-
ers in public offerings,73 auditors,74 outside counsel,75 rating agen-
cies,76 and venture capitalists.77 In order for a certification signal to be 
                                                                                                                      
 
71 See David Besanko & Anjan V. Thakor, Competitive Equilibrium in the Credit Market Un-
der Asymmetric Information, 42 J. Econ. Theory 167, 169–73, 179 (1987) (developing a the-
ory in which good borrowers use collateral to signal that they are confident in their ability 
to repay their debt). 
72 See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 916, 924–33 
(1998) (setting forth a general theory of “certification intermediaries” who screen for 
fraud or low-quality investment products for the benefit of third-party investors). 
73 See James R. Booth & Richard L. Smith II, Capital Raising, Underwriting, and the Certi-
fication Hypothesis, 15 J. Fin. Econ. 261, 271–80 (1986) (finding that underwriters serve a 
certification role regarding the value of securities); Wendy Gerwick Couture, Price Fraud, 
63 Baylor L. Rev. 1, 40–41 (2011) (discussing the role of underwriters in certifying the 
quality of an offering). 
74 See Randolph P. Beatty & Ivo Welch, Issuer Expenses and Legal Liability in Initial Public 
Offerings, 39 J.L. & Econ. 545, 553 (1996) (discussing the role of an auditor’s reputation as 
a signal to investors during an IPO); Krishnagopal Menon & David D. Williams, Auditor 
Credibility and Initial Public Offerings, 66 Acct. Rev. 313, 314 (1991) (finding that compa-
nies doing IPOs choose more prestigious auditors as a way of signaling quality and gaining 
credibility from investors); Randall S. Thomas et al., Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 115, 157–58 
(2001) (discussing large accounting firms’ roles in providing a signal of quality for com-
panies doing IPOs, in part due to their deep financial pockets). 
75 See Geoffrey Miller, From Club to Market: The Evolving Role of Business Lawyers, 74 
Fordham L. Rev. 1105, 1132–34 (2005) (discussing the diminishing value of the signal 
sent by the withdrawal of outside counsel, given industry changes in the way that compa-
nies hire and retain outside counsel). 
76 See Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach for 
Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1011, 1036–47 (2009) (discussing rating agen-
cies’ role in providing signals of quality and their responsibility for the overvaluation of 
mortgage-backed securities during the subprime mortgage crisis); Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 Yale J. 
on Reg. 457, 461–62 (2009) (discussing the role of rating agencies in certifying the quality 
of offerings, and explaining the overreliance on this signal in the context of the recession 
of 2007). 
77 See Paul A. Gompers, Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry, 42 J. Fin. Econ. 
133, 134–35 (1996) (discussing the role of certification by venture capitalists); Peggy M. 
Lee & Sunil Wahal, Grandstanding, Certification and the Underpricing of Venture Capital Backed 
2013] Fraudulent Corporate Signals: Conduct as Securities Fraud 659 
credible, the certifying party must suffer a loss of reputation or incur 
legal sanctions if it is negligent, colludes, or engages in other types of 
self-dealing.78 
B. Some Limitations of Standard Signaling Explanations 
 The signaling theories discussed in Section A were developed to 
explain why investors react positively or negatively to corporate conduct 
that, under standard finance theory, should not reveal any new infor-
mation, and thus should have no effect on a company’s market price. 
Accordingly, these signals are a way in which managers of good compa-
nies reveal nonpublic information to investors. If this is true, then one 
would expect that companies that routinely send positive signals will 
produce long-term returns that, on average, exceed those of companies 
that do not use signals, or send weaker ones. Nevertheless, empirical 
studies have failed to find strong support for the predictions of signal-
ing theories, particularly with regard to dividends79 and the underpric-
ing of IPOs.80 
 A second limitation to the predictions of signaling theories is that 
the behavior in question can often be explained in multiple ways. For 
example, IPO underpricing has also been explained as a reaction to 
other problems: the ability of informed investors to take advantage of 
                                                                                                                      
IPOs, 73 J. Fin. Econ. 375, 375–80 (2004) (describing the relationship between venture 
capital certification and the underpricing of IPOs); William L. Megginson & Kathleen A. 
Weiss, Venture Capital Certification in Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. Fin. 879, 880–83 (1991) 
(arguing that venture capitalists help certify the quality of a firm at the time of an IPO). 
78 See Tirole, supra note 35, at 249–51 (developing a general certification model in 
which good companies hire certifiers to separate themselves from bad companies, and in 
which certifiers keep a stake in the outcome of projects or put their reputations at stake, as 
a form of bonding). 
79 See Shlomo Benartzi et al., Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future or the Past?, 52 J. 
Fin. 1007, 1028–32 (1997) (finding no long-term relationship between dividends and in-
creases in future earnings that one would expect if good companies were using dividends 
as signals); Harry DeAngelo et al., Reversal of Fortune: Dividend Policy and the Disappearance of 
Sustained Earnings Growth, 40 J. Fin. Econ. 341, 369–70 (1996) (finding no relationship 
between dividends and future earnings growth). 
80 See Narasimhan Jegadeesh et al., An Empirical Investigation of IPO Returns and Subse-
quent Equity Offerings, 34 J. Fin. Econ. 153, 174 (1993) (finding that IPO underpricing does 
not reveal information that allows good firms to separate themselves from bad ones vis-à-
vis the ability to issue additional shares in future offerings); D. Katherine Spiess & Richard 
H. Pettway, The IPO and First Seasoned Equity Sale: Issue Proceeds, Owner/Managers’ Wealth, and 
the Underpricing Signal, 21 J. Banking & Fin. 967, 979–81 (1997) (finding that insiders typi-
cally sell large proportions of their shares at an IPO, which is contrary to the predictions of 
underpricing signaling theory). 
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uninformed ones,81 agency costs involving underwriters,82 the need to 
get potential investors to reveal information to underwriters,83 and the 
need to attract long-term investors.84 Stock repurchases have been ex-
plained as a way for managers to manipulate market price so that they 
can sell their own shares at a higher price.85 Dividends have been ex-
plained as a way for managers to take advantage of unsophisticated in-
vestors,86 or, alternatively, as a way to cater to them.87 
C. Issues Requiring Further Explanation 
 Even if one were to conclude that corporate signals should not be 
interpreted in the standard fashion, they still matter for our under-
standing of corporate communications and securities fraud. Four char-
                                                                                                                      
81 This can create a “winner’s curse” in which informed investors purchase only when 
they know that the company is good, whereas uninformed investors purchase in all offer-
ings. See Ljungqvist, supra note 45, at 389. The uninformed investors lose out when they 
buy bad companies, and are partially crowded out by the informed ones when they buy 
good companies. See Kevin Rock, Why New Issues Are Underpriced, 15 J. Fin. Econ. 187, 205–
07 (1986) (arguing that underpricing is needed to provide an incentive for uninformed 
investors to participate in IPOs). In part because of this winner’s curse problem, lead un-
derwriters now allocate shares through a process in which they build a “book” of potential 
buyers by eliciting information from the buyers about the price that they are willing to pay 
and the number of shares that they may be willing to buy. See Ljungqvist, supra note 45, at 
389. 
82 See David P. Baron & Bengt Holmstrom, The Investment Banking Contract for New Issues 
Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation and the Incentive Problem, 35 J. Fin. 1115, 1115–18 
(1980) (discussing the agency problem in the underwriting industry, including underwrit-
ers’ incentive to underprice, and various factors that can dull that incentive); Sean J. Grif-
fith, Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of 
Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 583, 618–23 (2004) (discussing the 
agency costs imposed by underwriters in pricing IPOs and allocating shares). 
83 See Lawrence M. Benveniste & Paul Spindt, How Investment Bankers Determine the Offer 
Price and Allocation of New Issues, 24 J. Fin. Econ. 343, 343–46 (1989) (setting forth a theory 
in which underwriters underprice offerings to get sophisticated purchasers, such as institu-
tional investors, to reveal information about how many shares they are willing to purchase 
at different prices). 
84 See Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 
849, 860–63 (2012) (describing the process by which underwriters allocate shares among 
repeat customers who implicitly promise to hold shares and not flip them, and the need to 
compensate long-term investors by underpricing stock). 
85 See Fried, supra note 60, at 448 (arguing that, contrary to the predictions of tradi-
tional signaling theory, managers will often sell their shares during stock repurchases, 
which undermines the value of the signal and suggests that managers are engaged in self-
dealing). 
86 See Brudney, supra note 6, at 112. 
87 See Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, A Catering Theory of Dividends, 59 J. Fin. 1125, 
1127 (2004) [hereinafter Catering Theory]; Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Appearing and 
Disappearing Dividends: The Link to Catering Incentives, 73 J. Fin. Econ. 271, 272–73 (2004). 
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acteristics of corporate signals require further explanation. First, in de-
termining how to act, managers take seriously the potential that their 
conduct will reveal some information to investors: they expect investors 
to decode their behavior and act on it. They expect, for example, that 
shareholders will most often react positively to an increase in dividends, 
to stock repurchases, to reducing the maturity of their company’s debt, 
and to subjecting themselves to the ongoing disclosure requirements 
and penalties of federal securities laws. In the alternative, managers 
expect that investors will react negatively to a cut in dividends or a reve-
lation that they have violated securities laws.88  Second, investors 
do react to corporate signals, and sophisticated investors know that 
managers expect them to react. Consequently, managers craft corpo-
rate communications to accentuate the positive, play down the nega-
tive, and, in bad times, delay as much as possible breaking the bad news 
to investors.89 Third, corporate signals have become a more prominent 
part of companies’ communication arsenals in recent years.90 Fourth, 
companies, at least those in the same industry, compete along a num-
                                                                                                                      
88 These negative reactions are themselves signals. In other words, investors use signals 
to communicate with managers and other investors. A company’s stock price, at any one 
point, is the end result of a series of trades that encapsulates the joint (average) beliefs of 
the market participants involved in the trades. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 
35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 526 (1945) (arguing that price signals in markets allow parties to 
transact with each other without having to communicate directly). The market price will 
thus send a signal to a company’s managers about the market’s beliefs about the com-
pany’s value. See id. It will also send a signal to other investors, who can now rely on that 
market price as a good indication of the aggregate beliefs of buyers and sellers in the mar-
ket. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (concluding that the mechanisms 
by which information gets incorporated into market price are sufficiently robust such that 
one may presume that investors have relied on the integrity of the market price). There 
are other ways in which the actions of one investor can send a signal to another. For exam-
ple, if an investor sells a large block of stock, other investors will infer from the size of the 
trade that a large investor is involved—the type of investor that is more likely to have pri-
vate information about the share’s true value. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, 
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 572–76 (1984) (discussing price 
decoding in capital markets). The sale therefore sends a signal to the market that the large 
investor may have acquired negative information about the company, which will lead other 
investors to sell. See id. Of course, market signals can be ambiguous—a seller may have 
liquidity needs and might be selling the best, most valuable portion of its portfolio to raise 
funds. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Asset Pricing Under Asymmetric Information: 
Bubbles, Crashes, Technical Analysis, and Herding 28 (2001) (drawing a distinction 
between traders who sell assets due to private reasons—such as a liquidity need—and those 
who sell for common reasons, such as private information that the assets are overvalued). 
89 See infra notes 101–141 and accompanying text (explaining how corporations strate-
gically use signals to their advantage). 
90 See infra notes 155–196 and accompanying text (positing that increased disclosure 
requirements under federal securities laws have caused an increase in the attractiveness 
and use of signals among corporations in recent years). 
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ber of dimensions. Managers know this, and know that competitors will 
monitor and react to their communications with investors (their signals 
and securities filings).91 These four characteristics require further ex-
planation, one that fully accounts for the dynamic nature of corporate 
signals. The rest of this Article begins to develop such an account, plac-
ing particular emphasis on the problem of the interaction of securities 
laws and corporate signals. 
II. Strategic Use of Corporate Signals by Managers 
 Corporate signals are “statements”: they communicate information 
about a company’s current operations or financial position, and its 
managers’ confidence in its future prospects.92 A “corporate signal” is 
created whenever two conditions hold: (1) a manager undertakes one 
or more actions on behalf of the corporation, or on his own behalf;93 
and (2) an interested third party—including investors, competitors, 
customers, suppliers, and regulators—observes those actions, either 
directly or indirectly.94 All of the signals discussed in Part I fall within 
                                                                                                                      
 
91 See supra notes 35–78 and accompanying text (describing the standard signaling ac-
count, including reactions to signals by competitors). 
92 A raw signal says little; the receiver has to interpret it within a particular context and 
use a special language and type of semantics that the interpreter will use to attach mean-
ings to the signals it observes. Judges will do the same when interpreting corporate signals. 
See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 Yale L.J. 1561, 
1566–69 (1994) (reviewing Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Judges (1993)) (argu-
ing that judges utilize linguistics for many difficult cases, particularly those involving am-
biguous statutes); Michael S. Moore, The Need for a Theory of Legal Theories: Assessing Prag-
matic Instrumentalism, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 988, 1006–07 (1984) (reviewing Robert Samuel 
Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory (1982)) (arguing that a the-
ory of law provides a syntax and semantics that needs to be taken into account in interpret-
ing legal texts); Thomas Morawetz, Law as Experience: Theory and the Internal Aspect of Law, 
52 SMU L. Rev. 27, 37–40 (1999) (describing some of the difficulties of characterizing the 
law as a language). 
93 For purposes of this Article, the term “manager” includes executives, such as the 
CEO, as well as the board of directors. To the extent that a CEO has effective control over 
the board of directors, this conflation raises little difficulty. In companies in which the 
board of directors exercises effective control, some corporate signals will be due to the 
actions of the board and others to the actions of the CEO. The analysis in this Article ap-
plies equally to both types of scenarios. 
94 An investor can observe a corporate or managerial action indirectly when actions 
are reported by third parties, such as securities analysts, underwriters, or even the SEC. A 
signal, more generally, is a form of communication between a sender, whose behavior car-
ries an informational message, and a receiver, who observes that behavior and attaches a 
meaning to it. In his book, Convention, the philosopher David Lewis describes a two-sided 
signaling problem as involving a communicator and an audience, where the communica-
tor uses signals—her actions—to send messages, and the audience is able to decode the 
signals and extract the messages. See David Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study 
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this definition, but they are not the only type of signals; these have been 
singled out because they are the ones that have received the most atten-
tion from commentators. Any observable action can act as a signal, in-
cluding, for example, building a new plant or shutting one down, pur-
chasing a company or selling a subsidiary, entering or leaving a market, 
firing the CEO or giving her a pay raise, and expanding or cutting back 
on research and development. Not all signals are material, in the sense 
that they elicit a robust reaction from investors.95 A manager may send 
a message to investors that is ignored, overlooked, or misinterpreted.96 
Similarly, investors may draw inferences from conduct that was not in-
tended to send a message.97 Although these two types of communica-
tion failures are important, they are the exception. As a result, this Arti-
cle assumes that managers send signals intentionally and strategically, 
and that investors extract information from those signals, which they 
use to make voting and trading decisions, and to interpret, supplement, 
and verify corporate disclosures. 
 This Part begins by setting forth a positive account of managers’ 
incentive to compose corporate communications strategically;98 they will 
have an incentive to combine verbal disclosures and corporate signals in 
a self-serving manner, and to take advantage of the bounded rationality 
of investors.99 This Part then argues that modern CEOs are hired for 
their ability to compose strategic communications to change the beliefs 
of customers, competitors, and regulators, and that those same skills are 
useful in composing strategic communications to change the beliefs of 
investors.100 
                                                                                                                      
130–41 (1969) (setting forth a signaling model, its use in achieving coordination, and the 
underlying importance of signals that are considered “conventional”). 
95 A reaction from investors is evidenced by a movement in the stock price. 
96 A number of empirical studies have found that investors sometimes delay reacting to 
news; they are inattentive, or at least not as attentive to corporate communications as the 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (“ECMH”) predicts. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & Terrance 
Odean, All That Glitters: The Effect of Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and 
Institutional Investors, 21 Rev. Fin. Stud. 785, 787–88 (2008); Stefano DellaVigna & Joshua M. 
Pollet, Investor Inattention and Friday Earnings Announcements, 64 J. Fin. 709, 709–10 (2009). 
The signaling problems identified in this Article exist whether investors react immediately or 
in a delayed fashion—both scenarios lead to the same general conclusions. 
97 See Kent D. Daniel et al., Overconfidence, Arbitrage, and Equilibrium Asset Pricing, 56 J. 
Fin. 921, 922–24 (2001) (arguing that overconfidence can lead investors to give too much 
weight to certain market signals). 
98 See infra notes 101–141 and accompanying text. 
99 See infra notes 101–141 and accompanying text. 
100 See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
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A. Composing Corporate Messages Strategically 
 Corporate communications carry information that can be used by 
investors and regulators to hold managers accountable.101 A rational 
manager, whose aim is to maximize her aggregate utility while em-
ployed by the company and afterwards,102 will want to avoid, or at the 
very least, delay being held accountable.103 To accomplish this, a man-
ager will carefully manage the flow of information to investors,104 by, 
among other things, combining verbal and non-verbal statements to 
produce an “aggregate message” that changes the beliefs of investors105 
in a way calculated to maximize the manager’s inter-temporal utility.106 
                                                                                                                      
 
101 See Patricia M. Fandt & Gerald R. Ferris, The Management of Information and Impres-
sions: When Employees Behave Opportunistically, 45 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Deci-
sion Processes 140, 142–45 (1990) (discussing incentives for employees to manipulate 
and hide information to avoid being held accountable); Robert A. Prentice, Regulatory 
Competition in Securities Law: A Dream (That Should Be) Deferred, 66 Ohio St. L.J. 1155, 1196–
97 (2005) (arguing that one major impediment of foreign companies cross-listing their 
securities in the United States is that managers would have to disclose more information, 
and thus be exposed to greater accountability); Joel Seligman, A Modest Revolution in Corpo-
rate Governance, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1159, 1160 n.12 (2005) (stating that “[a]ssuring 
that adequate information is provided to directors remains one of the most critical and 
difficult problems which boards of directors are facing today”). 
102 A manager cares not only about the returns that they receive while employed by a 
company, but also about those they will receive when they are employed with another 
company or after they have retired. See Stephen J. Choi & Eric L. Talley, Playing Favorites 
with Shareholders, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 271, 273 n.5 (2002) (discussing the role of reputational 
constraints in limiting a manager’s ability to engage in excessive self-dealing); Robert Gib-
bons & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory 
and Evidence, 100 J. Pol. Econ. 468, 468–71 (1992) (developing and testing a theory in 
which managers take into account their career concerns by trying to maximize returns 
while employed by the firm and afterward). 
103 Suppose that a company is performing poorly but there is a chance that the manager 
will be able to turn things around, and thus avoid being held accountable. As long as the 
potential costs from delay, such as incurring a higher penalty if he cannot turn things 
around, are less than the expected benefits from delay, which will depend on the likelihood 
of a turnaround, then the manager will find it valuable to delay. Waiting provides him with a 
“real option.” See Avinash Dixit & Robert Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty 10, 
39–40 (1994) (describing examples of real option analysis in the context of corporate deci-
sions, such as whether, and when, to build a new plant or close an existing one). 
104 See S.P. Kothari et al., Do Managers Withhold Bad News?, 47 J. Acct. Res. 241, 241–46 
(2009) (discussing managers’ incentives to delay disclosing bad news); Benjamin E. Her-
malin & Michael S. Weisbach, Transparency and Corporate Governance 2–3 (Univ. of Cal. & 
Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12875, 2007), available at http://www. 
nber.org/papers/w12875.pdf (arguing that increasing disclosure requirements exposes 
managers to more career risk, for which they have to be compensated, and which gives 
them an incentive to distort information). 
105 Each time nonpublic information gets released to the market, investors will use that 
information to update their beliefs about the company’s value. See Jonathan R. Macey et 
al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. 
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1. Message Arbitrage and Message Magnification 
 A manager will often have more than one way of composing a cor-
porate message—combining written disclosures, oral statements, and 
corporate signals—to change the beliefs of investors in the desired way. 
In choosing between these equally effective aggregate messages, a 
manager will take into account the expected costs associated with each: 
the transaction costs of preparing and sending a message, the expected 
sanctions under federal securities laws, and the costs from revealing 
information to competitors.107 As a general matter, managers will have 
an incentive to combine verbal disclosures and corporate signals in a 
way that dulls the impact of negative news (“message arbitrage”),108 and 
magnifies the impact of positive news (“message magnification”).109 
 One way to engage in message arbitrage is to use a positive corpo-
rate signal to dilute the impact of a negative disclosure.110 Suppose that 
a manager is required by the 1934 Act to disclose information in the 
annual report that will increase the likelihood of a market correction: 
the information provides some support for the view that the company is 
overvalued. To dilute the impact of that message, the manager may de-
                                                                                                                      
Levinson, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1017, 1023–24 (1991) (describing the adjustment process that 
investors go through after receiving new information). 
106 Managers are concerned with both immediate and delayed returns, even though 
there is some evidence that they tend to give greater weight to smaller immediate returns 
than to larger future returns that they could have obtained with greater patience. See David I. 
Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 435, 441–
43 (2010) (providing an overview of the literature on managerial myopia). Managers also 
sometimes cater too much to the current beliefs of investors, which can reinforce their own 
beliefs and lead to other distortions. See Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, Persuasion 
in Finance 2–5 (Oct. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=864686 (finding evidence that financial advertisements take 
into account current investor sentiment, and cater to it, which can lead to self-reinforcing 
beliefs and bubbles). 
107 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 
50 B.C. L. Rev. 639, 645 (2009) (stating that mandatory disclosure rules can provide valu-
able information to a company’s competitors). 
108 See Sendhil Mullainathan et al., Coarse Thinking and Persuasion, 123 Q.J. Econ. 577, 
578 (2008) (describing the “transference” technique, in which advertisers lead consumers, 
who have an existing analogous product or quality in mind, to make a connection or anal-
ogy with the product being sold). 
109 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Advisory Counterparts to Constitutional Courts, 56 Duke 
L.J. 953, 986 (2007) (describing, in the context of transparency and political accountability 
for government officials, the importance of paying “close attention to incentives and oppor-
tunities for obfuscation, [and] to the packaging and timing of information disclosures”). 
110 See Daniel Read et al., Choice Bracketing, 19 J. Risk & Uncertainty 171, 172 (1999) 
(describing “choice bracketing,” a phenomenon in which a decisionmaker may reach dif-
ferent conclusions depending on whether he or she considers pieces of information sepa-
rately or together). 
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cide to increase the company’s dividend or announce a stock buy-
back,111 which, as demonstrated in Part I, are actions generally inter-
preted positively by the market.112 If the manager has to send a nega-
tive signal to the market—such as cutting the dividend—it may be able 
to dilute its impact by disclosing positive information in the annual re-
port. A manager can do so, for example, by disclosing more elaborate 
financial projections than in the past, or by disclosing good news that 
he had been withholding lawfully.113 A manager can also engage in two 
other forms of message arbitrage: using a positive corporate signal to 
dull the impact of a negative signal,114 and using a positive disclosure to 
dilute the impact of a negative disclosure.115 
 A strategic manager will also make use of message magnification: 
intensifying the impact of signals or disclosures by sending two or more 
positive signals, making two or more positive disclosures, or combining 
positive signals and positive disclosures.116 A company may, for exam-
ple, combine signals by taking on short-term debt secured with collat-
                                                                                                                      
111 A company can be overvalued and still have the necessary cash flows to pay a divi-
dend. This would be the case when the overvaluation is due to anticipated changes in the 
industry that could negatively affect a company’s profitability in a year or two. See Efraim 
Benmelech et al., Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives, 125 Q.J. Econ. 1769, 
1774–82 (2010) (setting forth a model in which managers hide overvaluation by paying 
dividends as long as they can—until they run out of cash). 
112 See supra notes 45–59 and accompanying text. 
113 A manager could have been withholding information lawfully if the information 
had not yet become material or if it was not otherwise required to be disclosed under the 
1934 Act. 
114 An example of this would be combining long-term debt with collateral, or combining 
pre-IPO dividends with pre-IPO underpricing. A recent empirical study found that insiders 
routinely pay dividends right before an IPO. See Jens Martin & Richard Zeckhauser, Pre-IPO 
Dividend Puzzle 8 ( Jan. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1484703. The authors explained this as an attempt by 
insiders to get some money out of the company instead of selling more of their shares during 
the IPO, which would have sent an even more negative signal. See id. 
115 From a static perspective, it would not make sense to dilute good news with bad, 
except in very rare situations. For example, the manager is disclosing three pieces of in-
formation: one is very bad news, another is intermediate bad news, and the third is very 
good news. A manager may combine the very bad news with the good news, so that the 
composite message is closer to the intermediate bad news. In other words, by packaging 
them together, the manager may be able to reduce the variance—the distance between the 
very bad and very good news. The manager may do this if he believes that investors will not 
carry out this averaging on their own. 
116 See Read et al., supra note 110, at 176 (describing the adding-up effect, when the same 
choices are made repeatedly, whereby even trivial or non-noticeable factors are eventually 
magnified and made more salient); see also Warren S. Quinn, The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer, in 
Morality and Action 198, 199 (1993) (describing a similar magnification effect). 
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eral, or by announcing a stock split at the same time that it declares a 
dividend that is higher than what the market was expecting.117 
 A manager who is sufficiently forward-looking will take into ac-
count the uncertainty surrounding a company’s operations, financial 
performance, and access to capital, as well as the possibility that she will 
want to engage in message arbitrage or message magnification when 
unforeseen contingencies arise.118 Such a manager will have to take 
into account when the mandatory disclosures and signals will occur, so 
that they coincide with, or are sufficiently close to, each other.119 A 
manager may also save some good news for later, instead of disclosing 
all of it at once. For example, instead of increasing dividends every time 
the company’s cash flows increase, a manager may decide to save some 
of the cash flows to deal with future contingencies.120 
2. The Salience of Signals 
 In order to have its desired effect, a signal needs to be observed by 
investors.121 But observation alone is not sufficient. Subtle signals, hid-
den signals,122 and vague signals are all weak signals; effective commu-
                                                                                                                      
 
117 See H. Kent Baker & Patricia L. Gallagher, Management’s View of Stock Splits, 9 Fin. 
Mgmt. 73, 73 (1980) (stating that stock splits and increases in dividends often occur in 
tandem, which helps explain the corresponding price increase from these signals). 
118 In other words, a manager will make an intertemporal choice, choosing the best 
course of action in each period, and taking into account that this will happen again in the 
following period. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist 
Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 Geo. L.J. 1, 77–82 (2004) (discussing the utility maxi-
mizing approach to intertemporal decision making). 
119 If they cannot coincide, a manager will want the signals and disclosures to occur in 
the right order. See George F. Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Preferences for Sequences of Out-
comes, 100 Psychol. Rev. 91, 94–95 (1993) (finding that people have preferences about 
the order of outcomes, and sometimes prefer to get all bad outcomes out of the way before 
getting good outcomes, even though this contradicts the standard discounting prediction). 
120 This is a process known as “smoothing,” which is common in many areas where 
there are uncertain cash flows. See Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the 
Poor? Shortsighted Households and the Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 33, 
47–52 (2010) (discussing the process of “smoothing” using debt, in the context of in-
tertemporal saving and consumption decisions). 
121 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008) 
(stating that, under the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, a plaintiff’s reliance on the defen-
dant’s deceptive acts is not present when “deceptive acts were not communicated to the 
public” and “[n]o member of the investing public had knowledge, either actual or pre-
sumed, of respondents’ deceptive acts during the relevant times”). 
122 When sellers hide particular attributes of a company or make them less salient, 
consumers make different buying choices. See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded 
Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. Econ. 
505, 506–11 (2006) (discussing the various ways in which businesses hide information from 
consumers, particularly in the market for goods that require add-ons, such as printer car-
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nication requires salience,123 publicity, and precision.124 Message mag-
nification is one way to increase the salience of messages.125 The more 
salient a signal, the more likely that investors will incorporate it into 
their decision making.126 The more often a manager uses the same sig-
nal, the more entrenched that signal will become in the collective 
memory of investors, and the more likely that an expectation of conti-
nuity will take hold.127 In deciding whether to continue sending a posi-
tive signal, managers will take such an expectation into account, given 
that disrupting it will send a salient, negative signal.128 This has two im-
plications: first, corporate signals will be most impactful early on, as the 
expectations of shareholders are being built, and when they are 
changed or terminated; and second, once a corporation establishes its 
use of a certain signal, that signal can become path-dependent and 
sticky.129 
                                                                                                                      
 
tridges); Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 59, 70–77 (2009) (discussing the 
different effects of hidden and salient taxes). 
123 See Shelley E. Taylor & Suzanne C. Thompson, Stalking the Elusive “Vividness” Effect, 
89 Psychol. Rev. 155, 175 (1982) (defining “salience” as “the phenomenon that when 
one’s attention is differentially directed to one portion of the environment rather than to 
others, the information contained in that portion will receive disproportionate weighting 
in subsequent judgments”). 
124 See Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349, 
1354–55, 1411 (2011) (explaining that the most useful disclosure “informs people of what, 
precisely, they might do in order to avoid significant risks or obtain significant benefits,” 
and discussing the importance of salience and vividness in making choices). 
125 See supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text. 
126 See Asquith & Mullins, supra note 6, at 35–36 (arguing that signals involving num-
bers, such as dividends, are easier to use to draw comparisons with other companies). 
127 See Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Dividends as Reference Points: A Behavioral Sig-
naling Approach, 24–25, 29–32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18242, 
2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18242 (developing and testing a dynamic 
theory of dividend payments in which the salience of dividends—the fact that they are a 
number, and that round numbers tend to be used—and their repetition make them more 
memorable to investors and increase the magnitude of investor reactions to changes in 
dividends). Additionally, a manager will have an incentive to use multiple signals to the 
extent that they make the overall message more salient. 
128 See Alan Brav et al., Payout Policy in the 21st Century, 77 J. Fin. Econ. 483, 494 (2005) 
(revealing a survey of 166 dividend-paying companies, and finding that 93.8% of the sur-
veyed companies “tr[ied] to avoid reducing dividends per share,” 89.6% “tr[ied] to main-
tain a smooth dividend stream from year to year,” and 77.8% were “reluctant to make divi-
dend changes that might have to be reversed in the future”). 
129 See John Lintner, Distributions of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained 
Earnings, and Taxes, 46 Am. Econ. Rev. 97, 99 (1956) (finding that dividends are sticky and 
remain relatively stable, because managers do not increase and decrease them regularly to 
reflect changes in their companies’ earnings). The stickiness of dividends is one reason 
that companies sometimes make distributions through stock repurchases instead. See Kalay 
& Lemmon, supra note 53, at 45 (describing the general reluctance of managers to cut 
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3. Complexity and Bounded Rationality 
 Modern public corporations are highly complex,130 as are their 
disclosure documents. Investors need to make sense of the operations 
and financial health of corporations—a process that requires time and 
cognitive effort. As the time and effort needed to pierce through com-
plexity increase, so does the likelihood that investors will make deci-
sions without taking into account all of the information at their dis-
posal.131 Such investors exhibit bounded rationality.132 
 In determining how to craft a corporate message, a manager will 
take complexity into account. To the extent that he wants investors to 
get a clear picture quickly, a manager will try to reduce the overall 
complexity of the message. Corporate signals are generally less com-
plex; the information they carry is easier to extract, interpret, and put 
to use in making trading and voting decisions.133 A signal may be am-
biguous, but, at any one time, a corporate signal will have a fairly stable 
meaning among investors.134 That meaning may change over time: in-
                                                                                                                      
dividends as one reason that they will choose to make distributions using stock repurchases 
instead of dividends). 
130 As a general matter, a complex system is “one made up of a large number of parts 
that have many interactions,” where its complexity will increase whenever, given “the prop-
erties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the 
properties of the whole.” See Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial 183–84, 
(3d ed. 1996). The human body, for example, has more than 50 trillion cells. See C. Van 
Amerongen, The Way Things Work: An Illustrated Encyclopedia of Technology 13 
(1967). And the Library of Congress has approximately 155.3 million items. See Fascinating 
Facts, Lib. Congress, http://www.loc.gov/about/facts.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). Yet 
we can make sense of them in a large number of contexts, because we have a good sense of 
how the parts fit together. 
131 See Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, 
Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 7, 19–20 (1994) (arguing that most investors 
do not read or carefully analyze disclosures). 
132 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 
1471, 1477–78 (1998) (describing bounded rationality as a manifestation of the limited 
computational power of human beings, which leads them to make decisions based on heu-
ristic methods that diverge from the decisions they would make if they were fully rational). 
133 See supra notes 121–129 and accompanying text (describing the saliency of signals 
and how this effect makes them easier to comprehend). 
134 For example, the market price of a stock is a signal that encapsulates information 
about the preferences of market actors. Over a day of trading the stock price will change 
many times, but at any one point in time it is a clear signal of the supply and demand of 
the stock, and a clear signal of the information that has been incorporated into that price. 
See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities 
Regulation, 81 Va. L. Rev. 611, 652–56 (1995) (describing market price adjustments among 
traders with different expectations, in which at any one point the equilibrium market price 
is a stable signal of supply and demand, incorporating the information available, although 
not necessarily in the way predicted by the ECMH); supra note 96 (defining ECMH). 
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vestors, for example, sometimes value dividends more, and sometimes 
less.135 Furthermore, the credibility and impact of the certification sig-
nals of gatekeepers—such as auditors, underwriters, and rating agen-
cies—will vary. Their credibility will be lowest after it is revealed that 
they have systematically failed in their monitoring tasks, such as after 
the Enron scandal or during the Great Recession of 2007,136 and will 
increase whenever Congress or the SEC impose more stringent stan-
dards, such as after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“SOX”) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act (the “Dodd-Frank” Act).137 Although a signal’s meaning 
and clarity may vary over time, one can safely assume that, at any one 
point in time, managers will have a good sense of how the signal is 
likely to be received by investors.138 
 If a manager’s goal is to send a message that is relatively easy to 
interpret and use (one that has low complexity), it will have greater 
reason to use a corporate signal to the extent that a signal is available 
that will transmit the desired message.139 Because of the mandatory 
disclosure requirements of federal securities laws, a manager who wants 
investors to understand a message quickly may have to supplement the 
verbal disclosure with a salient, easy to understand signal.140 Similarly, if 
                                                                                                                      
 
135 See Baker & Wurgler, Catering Theory, supra note 87, at 1158–60 (finding that the at-
tractiveness of dividends to investors changes over time and that a manager is more likely 
to start a dividend program when the market’s value of the dividends is high). 
136 See Erica Beecher-Monas, Enron, Epistemology, and Accountability: Regulating in a Global 
Economy, 37 Ind. L. Rev. 141, 141–44 (2003) (stating that financial scandals, particularly 
the Enron scandal, decreased investor confidence and forced the government to pass seri-
ous reforms in the area of corporate governance); Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets 
Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. Banking Inst. 5, 40, 51–52 (2009) 
(describing how investors lost confidence in credit ratings agencies and the internal moni-
toring mechanisms of investment banks after the economic downturn in 2007). 
137 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.A. (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-196)). 
138 See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empower-
ment, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 653, 700–03 (2010) (describing investment decisions by managers, 
anticipating the potential market reaction to those decisions, and describing the distor-
tions that can occur as a result). 
139 See Asquith & Mullins, supra note 6, at 35–36 (describing the advantage of using 
signals over verbal disclosures in getting messages across with less risk of confusion). 
140 Using a signal to supplement complex verbal disclosures can help reduce the vola-
tility surrounding verbal disclosures. Because, as a general matter, information released by 
managers of public companies is quickly incorporated into market price, if a disclosure 
document is difficult to understand, then it may lead traders to incorporate information 
incorrectly. This may explain the observed delays in the market reaching a new equilib-
rium price after the release of new information, and the overreaction and underreaction 
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the manager wants to reduce transparency and cause investors to delay 
deciphering and using a piece of information, he will communicate the 
message using disclosure documents, either alone, or in combination 
with signals that help obfuscate the verbal disclosure.141 
B. Hiring Good Communicators 
 Managers of public corporations are hired because they are good 
strategic thinkers, problem solvers, and communicators—they can craft 
crisp messages to motivate their employees, attract customers, and keep 
competitors guessing. They are also skilled at crafting messages to in-
vestors and regulators to delay their being held accountable, to further 
entrench themselves, and to continue to compensate themselves hand-
somely, even when they are underperforming.142 A manager who can 
communicate effectively using all the means at her disposal will have a 
competitive advantage over one who is not a good strategic communi-
cator. Over time, one would expect that the managers who rise through 
the ranks and become CEOs are good at using corporate signals to 
ward off competitors and controlling when and how they will be held 
accountable. And one would also expect that they will make use of 
those signaling skills to better communicate with investors, and, when 
need be, to deceive them. 
III. The Growing Use of Corporate Signals: The Role Played by 
Federal Securities Laws, and the Consequences 
 Part I described the way that companies and managers use corpo-
rate signals, and the standard interpretation that economists and legal 
                                                                                                                      
problems discussed in the behavioral finance literature. See Michael Kaestner, Investors’ 
Misreaction to Unexpected Earnings: Evidence of Simultaneous Overreaction and Underreaction, 3 
ICFAI J. Behav. Fin. 1, 2–5 (2006) (finding both short-term underreaction and long-term 
overreaction by investors after companies announce unexpected changes in earnings). 
141 See Stacey R. Kole, The Complexity of Compensation Contracts, 43 J. Fin. Econ. 79, 101 
(1997) (arguing that as a company’s size and complexity increase, so does the discretion of 
the board of directors over compensation issues, whereas the ability of shareholders to 
influence compensation policy decreases). 
142 This leads to a perverse result: highly skilled managers will provide the greatest 
possible return to shareholders if things go well; they will also have the skills to provide the 
greatest possible loss to shareholders once companies start performing poorly. By symme-
try, poorly skilled managers give shareholders a lower average return, but with less risk, 
and less variance in the returns. This can be important for another reason: a shareholder 
who is risk averse feels added disutility whenever she has to bear more risk, so if two in-
vestments have the same expected returns, a risk-averse actor will prefer the one with the 
lower variance. 
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scholars have given to these signals.143 This set the stage for the princi-
pal argument in Part II: that managers will have an incentive to use 
corporate signals strategically, either to dilute the impact of verbal dis-
closures or other signals, or to magnify their salience.144 This Part be-
gins by providing a precise definition of “deceptive signals.”145 It then 
describes the underlying characteristics of corporate signals that can 
lead companies to engage in costly tit-for-tat signaling.146 The following 
Sections set out Part III’s principal positive claim: that a number of 
changes in federal securities laws over the last twenty years have made 
corporate signals increasingly attractive as a form of communication, 
and that this, in turn, has had the perverse effect of increasing the like-
lihood of stock bubbles and “signaling races.”147 
A. Deceptive Signals 
 A manager sends a “deceptive signal” when she makes a false 
statement about the company that she knows or should know investors 
are likely to interpret as a truthful statement.148 In sending a signal, a 
manager will have certain beliefs about the investors’ expectations and 
their likely interpretation of the signal, either because the manager has 
used the signal before or has observed competitors using it. If a com-
pany, for example, is in poor financial health and the manager wants to 
hide that fact from investors, she may increase the company’s dividend. 
If the manager knows or should know that investors will likely interpret 
the signal as evidence that the company is doing well, then the man-
ager has sent a deceptive signal; if an investor reaches that incorrect 
conclusion about the dividend, then it has been deceived.149 In short, 
                                                                                                                      
 
143 See supra notes 25–91 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra notes 101–141 and accompanying text. 
145 See infra notes 148–149 and accompanying text. 
146 See infra notes 150–154 and accompanying text. 
147 See infra notes 155–232 and accompanying text. 
148 A manager may also use corporate signals to communicate, truthfully or decep-
tively, with regulators, competitors, and even others within the company. These other uses 
of corporate signals, although important, are beyond the scope of this Article. For a dis-
cussion of the use of observable corporate conduct to communicate with regulators and 
competitors, see Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 Ga. L. 
Rev. 779, 831–33 (2011) (discussing the use of collateral and short-term debt to change 
the beliefs of investors, competitors, and regulators); Utset, supra note 5 (discussing the 
use of CEO compensation to send signals to other executives and the board of directors, 
and the use of compensation of division heads to send signals to other division heads). 
149 A signal may, of course, be “misleading” even if the manager sending it does not in-
tend to deceive investors; the actions may misrepresent the facts and send the wrong mes-
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an investor will be “deceived” by a signal if it interprets a false statement 
about the company as a true one. 
B. Tit-for-Tat Signaling 
 One problem with corporate signals is that it is difficult for inves-
tors to know whether the conduct in question is costly to the manager 
or the company. It is also difficult for investors to separate the good 
managers and companies from the bad.150 An overvalued company, for 
example, may be able to continue paying dividends, and increasing 
them if need be, for a long time.151 Conversely, a properly valued com-
pany that fails to follow suit will be penalized by the market, unless it 
can otherwise communicate that it is not overvalued.152 The problem 
can be restated in the following way. Managers have private information 
that is not available to investors. Some of that private information can 
be revealed to investors using corporate signals, but managers also have 
private information about whether the signal they are sending is truth-
ful or deceptive, and about how long they will be able to continue to 
send a deceptive signal before they have to reveal the truth to investors. 
A manager, therefore, has control over two levels of nonpublic informa-
tion. She has control over information about the company’s operations 
and financial condition, which she can transmit to investors using ver-
bal disclosures and corporate signals.153 Additionally, she has second-
order information about whether the disclosures and signals are truth-
ful and complete, or deceptive and incomplete. 
 A manager’s control over this second-order information about 
corporate signals has three important consequences. First, it increases 
the likelihood that good and bad companies will engage in tit-for-tat 
signaling, in which a bad company sends a deceptive signal, and a good 
company is forced to match it. This is because it is not just investors 
who are unsure about whether or not a signal is deceptive; a good 
company that observes a signal from a bad company will often not 
                                                                                                                      
sage due to negligence, not intentional deception. Furthermore, a signal may mislead, not 
due to any fault of the manager, but because investors misinterpret it. 
150 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (discussing the dynamics of corporate 
signaling and the difficulty of using signals to distinguish between good companies and 
bad companies). 
151 See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text (discussing the payment of dividends 
as a positive signal to investors). 
152 See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text. 
153 See supra notes 45–78 and accompanying text (discussing the various signals avail-
able for corporations and managers to send to investors). 
674 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:645 
know the sender’s true type.154 Second, because of the second-order 
nonpublic information, these tit-for-tat dynamics can last for a relatively 
long time. Third, as we will see below, tit-for-tat signaling can lead to 
stock bubbles and “signaling races,” in which companies repeatedly 
ratchet up the intensity of their signals. 
C. Changes in Securities Regulation and the Growing Use of Corporate Signals 
 Congress has mandated companies to make extensive disclosures 
about their operations and financial results, and about the managers 
themselves.155 Over time, companies have been required to disclose 
more information156 and to do so quicker,157 and have been subjected 
to increasingly higher sanctions if they fail to comply.158 Corporate 
communications are like water balloons, at least in one respect: if Con-
gress and the SEC “squeeze” on the verbal portion, managers will in-
creasingly rely on using corporate signals to communicate with inves-
tors. This Section examines a number of characteristics of current 
securities laws—instituted to increase transparency and deter miscon-
duct—which have had the unintended side effect of giving managers 
an incentive to rely on corporate signals as much as possible when 
communicating with investors. The principal normative implication, to 
which I return in Part IV, is straightforward: if the goal is to reduce the 
total amount of fraud, Congress and the SEC should regulate corporate 
communications holistically, taking into account how changes aimed at 
regulating verbal disclosures can impact corporate signaling, and vice 
versa. 
                                                                                                                      
154 See Tirole, supra note 35, at 241. 
155 The government has enforced these disclosure requirements using civil and crimi-
nal sanctions. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 401–409, 901–906, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 
116 Stat. 745, 785–91, 804–06 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 
29 U.S.C.A. (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-196)) (setting forth enhanced financial re-
porting requirements, including timing requirements and potential criminal penalties for 
violations). 
156 See id. §§ 401, 403–404 (amending the 1934 Act, and requiring disclosures in peri-
odic reports, disclosures of transactions involving management and principal stockholders, 
and management assessments of internal controls). 
157 See id. § 409 (amending the 1934 Act, and requiring companies to disclose informa-
tion regarding material changes in their financial conditions or operations “on a rapid and 
current basis”). 
158 See id. §§ 903, 906 (increasing the maximum criminal penalties for mail fraud and 
wire fraud from five years imprisonment to twenty years, and establishing criminal penal-
ties for the failure of corporate officers to certify financial reports). 
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1. The Disparity in Potential Securities Laws Liability 
 Compared to verbal disclosures, deceptive signals are underen-
forced by federal securities laws—a practice that affects the way in 
which managers commit fraud.159 Consequently, a manager will have 
an incentive to use deceptive signals first, and will only turn to actual 
verbal misrepresentations and omissions if the signals are insufficient to 
change the beliefs of investors in the intended manner. As we saw in 
Part II, a manager can, in many instances, send the same message using 
different combinations of verbal statements and corporate signals.160 In 
choosing from a set of equivalent messages, each of which has the same 
effect in deceiving investors, a rational manager will choose the one 
with the lowest expected sanctions.161 As long as the expected sanctions 
associated with verbal deceptions are greater than those for deceptive 
signals, managers who are intent on deceiving investors will make rela-
tively greater use of signals. 
2. The Effect of Higher Sanctions for Securities Laws Violations 
 Increasing the gross sanctions for violating disclosure require-
ments will give managers a greater incentive to communicate with in-
vestors using corporate signals. One reason is that a manager who 
makes verbal disclosures that comply with the securities laws may still be 
subject to a private cause of action, either by mistake or because a 
plaintiff brings a strikesuit—one that has no merit, but does have a set-
tlement value.162 Additionally, to the extent that managers are risk-
                                                                                                                      
 
159 See Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp., 565 F.3d 200, 
208 (5th Cir. 2009) (focusing on the defendant CEO’s statements regarding the timing of 
future dividend payments, instead of the dividend payments themselves, as evidence of 
security fraud in a class action suit); In re Centerline Holdings Co. Sec. Litig., 678 F. 
Supp. 2d 150, 161–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (focusing on the defendant CEO’s statements re-
garding a future plan for dividend payments, instead of the dividend payments themselves, 
as evidence of security fraud in a class action suit). 
160 See supra notes 107–120 and accompanying text (discussing message magnification 
and message arbitrage). 
161 If making a false disclosure causes a $100,000 harm to investors and society at large, 
then a manager will be effectively deterred if the expected sanctions are at least $100,000. 
Those expected sanctions depend on the gross sanction and the probability that a viola-
tion will be detected and prosecuted. This probability will depend on how much investors 
and the SEC spend on monitoring and bringing causes of action. See Steven Shavell, 
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 503–04 (2004). 
162 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21C(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (2006) (granting 
the SEC the authority to file cease and desist orders for violations of provisions of the 1934 
Act); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 166–
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averse, which is the standard assumption, the higher the gross sanc-
tions, the greater will be the managers’ incentive to rely on corporate 
signals to deceive investors.163 This is important, because in the last 
twenty years, Congress has repeatedly ratcheted up the civil and crimi-
nal fines and prison sentences for violations of federal securities laws, 
with the biggest recent increase coming from SOX,164 and to a lesser 
degree, the Dodd-Frank Act.165 
3. Increasing Complexity of Disclosure Documents 
 As corporations become more complex, they become less trans-
parent to investors, and it becomes more likely that their managers will 
engage in fraud. In turn, this fraud can lead to corporate scandals, 
stock market bubbles, and, in the case of financial institutions, financial 
crises. The standard reaction of regulators is to increase the amount of 
disclosure that public companies must make; SOX,166 the Dodd-Frank 
Act,167 and a number of SEC rules168 that have been adopted since 
                                                                                                                      
67 (1994) (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 
to provide civil remedies for private causes of action involving securities fraud). 
163 Risk-averse managers will be over-deterred by higher gross sanctions. See Louis Kap-
low, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. Legal Stud. 307, 353 
(1994) (arguing that when individuals are risk-averse, it may be optimal to increase en-
forcement, and thus increase the probability of detection, and lower the gross sanctions). 
164 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 802, 1101, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512–1513, 1519 (2006 & 
Supp. II 2009) (establishing criminal penalties for altering or destroying documents and 
record tampering); see also Craig S. Lerner & Moin A. Yahya, “Left Behind” After Sarbanes-
Oxley, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1383, 1384–85 (2007) (describing the extraordinary increases 
in criminal penalties, including imprisonment, created by SOX). 
165 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-47 (Supp. V 2011) (adding penalties under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act for 
violations of cease and desist orders); id. § 202(a)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(C) 
(Supp. V 2011) (establishing a criminal penalty of no more than a $250,000 fine and no 
more than five years in prison for disclosing the appointment of a receiver for a financial 
institution). 
166 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.A. (West, Westlaw through P.L. 
112-196)). 
167 The preamble of the Dodd-Frank Act reads: “An Act [t]o promote the financial sta-
bility of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to 
protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.” 
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1734 (2010) (codified in scattered sections 
of the U.S. Code) (emphasis added); see also Randall Dodd, Subprime: Tentacles of Crisis, Fin. 
& Dev., Dec. 2007, at 15, 18 (stating that mortgage-backed security problems were caused 
in part by the fact that the “price discovery process is not transparent, and there is no sur-
veillance in the market to identify where there are large or vulnerable positions”). 
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2001 have taken this approach. But every time that Congress or the 
SEC adds an additional disclosure requirement in the hopes of making 
corporations more transparent, they increase the complexity of the dis-
closure documents themselves. 
 All other things being equal, as more parts are added to a system, 
its complexity increases.169 At an extreme, a corporation may be com-
pletely transparent to investors, yet still be completely opaque from the 
perspective of making trading decisions, due to the investors’ bounded 
rationality.170 To trade profitably, an investor needs “real-time transpar-
ency”:171 the ability to acquire and process corporate communications, 
and identify and exploit arbitrage opportunities before others do.172 In 
modern capital markets, a delay of a few minutes,173 or even a few sec-
                                                                                                                      
168 In 2006, for example, the SEC adopted amendments to further enhance the disclo-
sure requirements for executive compensation, director independence, and other matters 
of corporate governance. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.201, 229.306, 229.401 to .404, 229.601, 
229.1107, 232.304, 245.100 (2012). 
169 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 
2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 19 (discussing the limits of traders’ ability to process and use com-
plex information about complex transactions and the entities involved in the transac-
tions); see also Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and 
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. Econ. 505, 505–11 (2006) (discussing 
the general problems inherent in creating transparency when investment products have 
multiple attributes). 
170 See Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC 
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1601, 1650–78 (2012) (arguing that some corporations, 
such as financial institutions, have become too complex for the traditional investor to un-
derstand, even when they liberally disclose internal information). 
171 See Utset, supra note 148, at 806–09 (developing the concept of “real-time transpar-
ency”). 
172 See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 293, 294–303, 
369–82 (2012) (providing an overview of the interaction between complexity, real-time 
constraints, and disclosures about financial institutions, and suggesting certain metrics to 
reduce the complexity of quickly understanding the true financial state of institutions); 
Daniel Beunza & David Stark, Tools of the Trade: The Socio-Technology of Arbitrage in a Wall 
Street Trading Room, 13 Indus. & Corp. Change 369, 393–95 (2004); John Aidan Byrne, 
Hooked on Speed, Institutional Investor’s Alpha, 1 ( Jan. 7, 2007), http://www.iinews. 
com/site/pdfs/Alpha_Jan_07_Hooked_on_Speed.pdf. 
173 See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Con-
cepts No. 2: Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information, at Con2-17 
(2008) (stating that information is timely if it is available to users “before it loses its capacity 
to influence decisions”). This sort of real-time constraint is common in engineering, espe-
cially when designing critical safety systems, such as air-traffic-control computer systems, 
safety features for hospital equipment, or nuclear power plants. See John A. Stankovic, Real-
Time and Embedded Systems, in Computer Science Handbook 83-1, 83-1 (Allen B. Tucker ed., 
2d ed. 2004) (defining a real-time system as a system that works properly if it undertakes the 
correct tasks at either a specific point in time or no later than a set deadline). 
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onds in some cases, can make information stale.174 Although this has 
always been the case, the importance of acting quickly has increased 
with the proliferation of computerized trading.175 
 One would expect that an investor who has access to different 
types of information will first resort to that which is least costly to ac-
quire and use.176 Corporate signals are less complex and can be inter-
preted much quicker than verbal disclosures.177 Given the increasingly 
                                                                                                                      
 
174 That is, in some cases, the information will become stale before it can be processed 
and used, as is sometimes the case with price data in capital markets. See Maureen O’Hara, 
Market Microstructure Theory 252–60 (1995) (discussing various issues in defining 
market transparency in the context of capital markets); see also Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 § 11A(a)(1)(C)(iii), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(C)(iii) (2006) (stating that the market 
requires “the availability to brokers, dealers, and investors of information with respect to 
quotations for and transactions in securities”); Div. of Mkt. Regulation, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Market 2000: An Examination of Current Equity Market Developments, at 
IV-1 (1994) (explaining that “transparency” in the capital markets refers to “the real-time, 
public dissemination of trade and quote information”); Comments at the Meeting of the Advisory 
Committee on Market Information, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Commission, (Oct. 10, 2000), http:// 
www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/marketinfo/101000mtg.htm (reporting that Annette L. 
Nazareth, director of the SEC’s Division of Market Regulation, stated that “real-time public 
dissemination of trade and quotation information is one of the central components of our 
national market system”). 
175 See Robert K. Abbott & Hector Garcia-Molina, Scheduling Real-Time Transactions: A Per-
formance Evaluation, 17 ACM Transactions on Database Systems. 513, 513–14 (1992) (de-
scribing the design of a program trading system to exploit short-lived arbitrage opportunities 
in real time, given that “[p]rice discrepancies are normally very short-lived and to exploit 
them one must trade large volumes on a moments [sic] notice”); M.A.H. Dempster & C.M. 
Jones, A Real-Time Adaptive Trading System Using Genetic Programming, 1 Quantitative Fin. 
397, 401 (2001) (stating that it is necessary that program trading systems “respond quickly to 
the market, and thus not use rules which are infeasible in terms of real-time execution”); 
Terrence Hendershott et al., Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?, 66 J. Fin. 1, 1–4 
(2011) (providing an overview of high-speed trading); Jiading Gai et al., The Externalities of 
High Frequency Trading, 2–6 (May 25, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2066839 (describing the evolution in trading 
technologies and investors’ current ability to execute trades in nanoseconds, as well as the 
competition among trading firms to reduce time even further). 
176 An investor in a complex company—a conglomerate, such as General Motors or 
General Electric—will need to weigh the costs of deciphering the highly complex corpo-
rate information and financial statements in annual and quarterly reports against the 
benefits of having a better understanding of the company’s true financial state. This simply 
involves a standard cost-benefit analysis, taking into account the real-time transparency 
constraint. 
177 See Asquith & Mullins, supra note 6, at 35–36 (arguing that corporate signals, such 
as dividends and stock repurchases, have the “advantages of simplicity and visibility,” 
whereas verbal disclosures are complex and “require time and expertise to decipher”). 
When compared to mandatory corporate disclosures, corporate signals are coarse but 
useful “rules of thumb” (heuristics) for evaluating companies and making decisions about 
whether to buy or sell securities at the prevailing market price. See Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in Judgment Under Uncer-
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binding real-time constraints, it follows that, as disclosure documents 
become more complex, rational investors will make greater use of cor-
porate signals. Additionally, as we have seen, rational managers will 
have an incentive to compose corporate messages strategically, increas-
ing or decreasing their complexity depending on how quickly they 
want them deciphered.178 At an extreme, these messages can become 
so complex, and the time available to deal with that complexity so 
short, that an investor may choose to ignore most verbal disclosures, 
and instead make decisions based on available corporate signals or the 
signals from other traders.179 
4. The Effect of Coupling Signals and Mandatory Disclosures 
 The 1933 Act and the 1934 Act require a large amount of disclo-
sure about the behavior of companies and their managers.180 For exam-
ple, a public corporation subject to the reporting requirements of the 
1934 Act will have ongoing disclosure obligations about its operations 
and financial condition.181 These requirements include disclosures re-
garding material corporate actions, such as paying a dividend,182 repur-
chasing stock,183 changing the way the company does business,184 build-
ing new plants,185 changing accountants or disagreeing with them,186 
                                                                                                                      
tainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 3–20 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (providing 
an overview of heuristics used by boundedly rational decisionmakers). 
178 See supra notes 130–141 and accompanying text (describing the incentives of man-
agers to exploit complexity and the bounded rationality of investors). 
179 Both approaches are, at their core, heuristics to deal with the bounded rationality 
and real-time constraints of traders. The latter approach, relying on the signals from other 
traders—mimicking their buying and selling decisions—can lead to a herding effect. See 
Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. Econ. 797, 798 (1992) (devel-
oping a herding model in which actors mimic actions of others, notwithstanding the fact 
that if they relied on their own information, they would have acted differently). 
180 See Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a–77aa (West, 
Westlaw through P.L. 112-142)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a–78pp (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-158)). 
181 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (setting forth the 
general ongoing disclosure requirement for issuers who have securities registered pursu-
ant to section 12 or fall under the requirements of section 15(d) of the 1934 Act). 
182 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.201(c) (2012). 
183 See id. § 229.703. 
184 See id. § 229.101(a)(1). 
185 See id. § 229.101 (requiring the disclosure of an anticipated material acquisition of a 
plant or equipment); id. § 229.701(f)(4)(vii) (requiring the disclosure of the extent to 
which the issuer used proceeds from a securities offering for the “construction of plant, 
building and facilities; purchase and installation of machinery and equipment; [or] pur-
chases of real estate”). 
186 See id. § 229.304. 
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issuing equity or debt securities,187 selling or purchasing assets,188 ac-
quiring other companies, and disposing of subsidiaries.189 In regard to 
the conduct of managers and the board of directors, companies must 
disclose information about awarding compensation packages,190 exercis-
ing stock options,191 selling stock, and a board member’s resignation.192 
These disclosure requirements will make signals public (observable by 
investors) and increase their salience because the conduct is either ma-
terial or the SEC has determined that it is important enough to man-
date its disclosure. Disclosure, thus, puts corporate signals into play as 
part of a company’s communication package, and highlights them pub-
licly. 
 It is instructive to look at the relationship between signaling and 
both mandatory and voluntary disclosures about dividends. A regis-
tered company is required to disclose general information about divi-
dends, including their frequency, the amount paid in the last two years, 
and any contractual restrictions on their payment.193 Additionally, 
companies that have not been paying a dividend “although earnings 
indicate an ability to do so . . . are encouraged to consider the question 
of their intention to pay cash dividends in the foreseeable future,” and 
to disclose the result of their deliberations.194 Companies that have 
been paying a dividend “also are encouraged to indicate whether they 
                                                                                                                      
187 See id. § 229.202. 
188 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a)(1) (2012) (requiring a description of the “acquisition or 
disposition of any material amount of assets otherwise than in the ordinary course of busi-
ness”); id. § 229.601(b)(10)(ii)(C) (requiring the filing of contracts for the “acquisition or 
sale of any property, plant or equipment for a consideration exceeding 15 percent of such 
fixed assets of the registrant on a consolidated basis”). 
189 See id. § 229.101. 
190 See id. 
191 See id. § 240.16a-3; see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Release No. 33-8732A, Execu-
tive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure (2006), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33–8732a.pdf (providing an overview of the disclosure require-
ments for the exercise of options and restricted stock). 
192 See SEC Form 8-K, Item 5.02, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k. 
pdf (requiring the disclosure of the resignation of a board member, including the disclosure 
of whether the departure was due to a corporate governance disagreement). 
193 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.201(c)(1). Item 202 (Description of Registrants Securities), Item 
303 (Selected Financial Data), and Item 402 (Executive Compensation) require compa-
nies to make disclosures about dividends. See id. § 229.202(a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(4) (requiring 
a description of dividend rights, particularly in connection with preferred stock, and re-
strictions, included in debt securities, on the payment of dividends); id. § 229.301 (requir-
ing the disclosure of cash dividends); id. § 229.402 (requiring the disclosure of dividends 
or other earnings paid on stock or option awards, and on deferred compensation). 
194 Id. § 229.201(c)(2) (instructing companies that “if no such intention exists, to 
make a statement of that fact in the filing”). 
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currently expect that comparable cash dividends will continue to be 
paid in the future, and, if not, the nature of the change in the amount 
or rate of cash dividend payments.”195 
 The aim of these disclosure requirements is straightforward: to 
provide advanced warning to investors about changes in a company’s 
dividend policy. By highlighting the issue, the SEC increases the sali-
ence of an announcement of a future change or an immediate change 
in dividend policy. Suppose that a company that has not made any dis-
closures about its future intentions announces an immediate reduction 
of its dividends. Investors will reason that if the company had been able 
to anticipate the financial changes that have impacted its ability to pay 
dividends, then it would have disclosed them in advance. No disclosure 
means that the changes were unexpected. In turn, this will increase the 
signal’s impact because it is transferring information about material, 
but unexpected, changes in the company’s financial position.196 
D. Deceptive Signals, Bubbles, and Signaling Races 
 So far, this Article has argued that managers are more likely to use 
deceptive signals than deceptive verbal disclosures, and more likely to 
use truthful signals than to resort to using verbal disclosures, unless 
mandated by law. This Article has also argued that the incentive to use 
both deceptive and truthful signals as a form of communication has 
been exacerbated by changes in securities laws that, ostensibly, were 
aimed at making corporations more transparent and at deterring secu-
rities fraud. This Section provides two additional arguments about why 
it is important for policymakers to regulate fraudulent communica-
tions, including verbal and non-verbal fraudulent statements. 
                                                                                                                      
195 Id. 
196 There is evidence of a similar type of reasoning in the context of companies that 
miss their earnings projections. A study that surveyed over 400 CFOs found that they are 
generally “willing to make small or moderate sacrifices in economic value to meet the 
earnings expectations of analysts and investors to avoid the severe market reaction for 
under-delivering,” based in part on the following reasoning: 
[T]he market believes that most firms can ‘‘find the money’’ to hit earnings 
targets. Not being able to find one or two cents to hit the target might be in-
terpreted as evidence of hidden problems at the firm. Additionally, if the firm 
had previously guided analysts to the [earnings per share] target, then miss-
ing the target can indicate that a firm is managed poorly in the sense that it 
cannot accurately predict its own future. 
John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. Acct. 
Econ. 3, 5 (2005); see Brav et al., supra note 128, at 491 (discussing the general reluctance 
of managers to cut dividends out of fear of investors’ reactions). 
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 Companies pay attention to the disclosure documents and corpo-
rate signals of their competitors.197 There is usually a lag time between 
when a company issues a signal and when it has to bear the full costs 
from that signal.198 In order to make it appear that an IPO is under-
priced, an insider in a bad company may hold on to its stock, but it will 
bear the cost only later, if it sells the stock after a market correction.199 
A bad company may be able to continue to pay and increase its divi-
dend until it runs out of cash, which may be for a long time, particu-
larly if it can fool creditors into lending it funds that can then be paid 
out as a dividend.200 This lag time allows bad companies to pool them-
selves with good ones, at least for a period of time, and is most likely to 
be an effective strategy at the beginning of stock bubbles, when the 
market is not as vigilant about the potential that bad companies are 
engaged in deceptive signaling.201 It can also lead to signaling races 
during periods in which good and bad companies compete to show the 
market that they are not overvalued. Finally, it can lead to the overreli-
ance on unstable layered signals, each of which relies on the other for 
its certification. 
                                                                                                                      
197 There is a large literature in industrial organization and game theory dealing with 
signaling among competitors, including sending costly signals to deter entry or to coordi-
nate collusions. See, e.g., Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Informational Asymmetries, Strategic 
Behavior, and Industrial Organization, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 185, 185–87 (1987) (summarizing 
the literature on signaling among competitors, in the context of predatory pricing, price 
wars, and advertising using introductory offers to attract competitors); Steven C. Salop, 
Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 335, 337 (1979) (arguing that established firms 
use limit pricing as a signal to potential entrants about post-entry pricing intentions). 
198 See Asquith & Mullins, supra note 6, at 35–36 (arguing that investors typically need 
“time and expertise” to interpret many corporate signals, other than dividends, and there-
fore the signals’ impact is not immediate); Ayres, supra note 6, at 975 (arguing that ineffi-
ciencies in the market create a gap in time between when a signal is sent and when inves-
tors will react to it). 
199 A manager can use a similar strategy—not selling its shares—as a signal during a 
stock buyback. 
200 See Moody’s Investor’s Serv., Special Comment, Rating Private Equity Trans-
actions 2–3 (2007), available at http://www.collectif-lbo.org/international/Moodys_on_ 
private_equity_07_2007.pdf (finding that some private equity firms have been issuing debt 
and immediately using it to pay dividends even though they stated a commitment to reduce 
leverage). 
201 See Andrew C.P. Hertzberg, Essays in Microeconomics, Corporate Finance, and So-
cial Learning 11–15, 61 (Aug. 15, 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/28817/6031 
5643.pdf?sequence=1 (developing a model in which monitors engage in less monitoring 
during the front-end of bubbles). 
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1. Signaling Dynamics Among Competitors and the Potential for 
Bubbles 
 In market bubbles, companies in an industry transition through 
four phases.202 In the first phase, the whole industry is doing relatively 
well, and things are getting better.203 Initially, some good companies 
may try to separate themselves, but as the entire industry begins to be 
overvalued, it becomes costlier to send a sufficiently salient signal that 
cannot be mimicked by bad firms.204 As the boom takes hold in the 
second phase, good companies will accept the pooling equilibrium be-
cause separating themselves is too costly and increasingly risky.205 
Hoarding cash can help good companies weather bad times, so one 
would expect that they will not send the maximal signal—the one that 
will assure that they can separate themselves from the bad companies. 
There is a second reason for caution: bubble valuations are fraught 
with uncertainty, and even managers of companies that are doing well 
may worry that other companies are doing even better.206 In the third 
phase—the beginning-of-the-end-of-the-boom—companies know that a 
market correction is inevitable, although not immediately.207 As some 
companies begin to fail and the market begins to consider the possibil-
ity of a bubble, the surviving bad companies will ratchet up their signals 
to try to buy themselves some time to turn things around; the good 
companies will have to match the signals or be singled out as being 
“bad.”208 This signaling race will cause more of the bad firms to fail, 
and cause further ratcheting up of costly signals, and eventually will 
usher in the fourth phase: an industry-wide market correction.209 It is at 
this point that the good surviving companies will find the greatest value 
in sending costly signals. This type of signaling race—involving signal-
                                                                                                                      
202 See Paul Povel et al., Booms, Bust, and Fraud, 20 Rev. Fin. Econ. 1219, 1220–23 
(2007) (describing the different phases involved in stock market bubbles and the incen-
tives in different phases to commit fraud). 
203 See id. at 1222. 
204 See id. (arguing that even bad firms can receive financing and keep up with good 
firms during a boom because of the perceived state of the economy). 
205 See id. 
206 See id. (arguing that a boom creates an inflated perception of the state of the econ-
omy, and that a surprising number of firms, including good firms, will engage in fraud to 
improve their market value). 
207 See id. at 1221–22. 
208 See Povel et al., supra note 202, at 1221–22. Recall that what is motivating the signal-
ing dynamics is the fact that investors do not have access to the inside, nonpublic informa-
tion that would allow them to distinguish between good and bad firms. See supra notes 35–
44 and accompanying text. 
209 See Povel et al., supra note 202, at 1222. 
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ing using short-term debt and collateral—was in part responsible for 
the Great Recession of 2007.210 
2. Signaling Races: Collateralized Short-Term Debt and “Blind 
Investors” 
 Someone lending funds to a complex corporation may choose to 
engage in due diligence, read disclosure documents, and meet with 
management—all of which are costly. Alternatively, the lender can de-
sign a “blind debt” instrument by making the maturity infinitesimally 
small and taking collateral.211 The lender would rollover the debt 
blindly and stop only if it becomes concerned about the collateral’s 
value.212 As a general matter, the complexity of large public companies 
is greater than that of a piece of collateral, even when that collateral is a 
highly complex derivatives product.213 By the onset of the financial crisis 
in 2007, complex financial institutions were financing a large portion of 
their working capital—in some cases, up to fifty percent—using over-
night repurchase agreements (“overnight repos”).214 Agreeing to fi-
nance a large part of a company’s operations using overnight repos 
sends a very strong signal: unless the borrower is able to convince lend-
ers to roll over their debt every day, it will fail.215 Suppose that lenders 
begin to suspect that some financial institutions may be experiencing 
difficulties, but, given the complexity of these institutions, they are un-
able to separate the good from the bad. One way for borrowers to con-
tinue to use the signal is to ratchet up its intensity by borrowing a larger 
                                                                                                                      
210 See infra notes 211–228 and accompanying text. 
211 A “blind investor” is thus one whose interactions with a corporation are not based 
on information emerging from the corporation. Although this may appear like a rare oc-
currence, it is more common than it may first appear. In fact, under the efficient capital 
market hypothesis, a rational investor would make all decisions about whether to buy or 
sell a company, not by reading disclosure documents, but by finding out at what price it is 
trading: if capital markets are perfectly efficient, then that price will incorporate all of the 
information necessary to value a company. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance 
Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. Law. 1, 3–5 (1982) 
(arguing that, given efficient capital markets, investors can rely on market price and do 
not need to make sense of corporate disclosures in order to make sound investments). 
212 See Utset, supra note 148, at 809–22 (arguing that when faced with increasing com-
plexity, some debt holders will resort to “blind debt,” and showing that if a sufficiently 
large number of lenders resort to blind debt, the level of systemic risk can increase greatly, 
as can the potential for a sudden collapse of the short-term collateralized debt market). 
213 See id. 
214 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo 4 (Yale 
Int’l Ctr. Fin., Working Paper No. 09-14, 2010). Institutions were essentially borrowing 
funds for a day and using securities, such as mortgage-backed securities, as collateral. 
215 See id. at 13. 
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portion of their operating capital using overnight repos. Those who 
cannot keep up with the tit-for-tat dynamics will be exposed as being in 
financial trouble. But eventually, this sort of signaling race may threaten 
the survival of companies that were financially stable at the onset of the 
race. 
 This helps explain why, in 2007 and 2008, some financial institu-
tions failed overnight.216 Moreover, because lenders had been financ-
ing financial institutions using blind debt, and institutions had become 
so large and complex, even financially sound institutions had difficul-
ties convincing lenders and regulators that they could survive.217 Ulti-
mately, the government stepped in and forced all institutions to pool 
themselves by forcing them to participate in the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP).218 This forced pooling was in part aimed at ending 
the signaling race. Furthermore, there is an additional cost when inves-
tors over-rely on signals and low-information contractual protections: 
information about companies and whole industries is never generated, 
and the system as a whole begins to experience an information deficit. 
3. Layered Signals: Complex Derivatives, Rating Agencies, and Toxic 
Assets 
 Suppose that investors considering purchasing a complex deriva-
tive security, if they had to go at it alone, would read the disclosure 
document with care, but if the security had a AAA rating then they 
would purchase it “blindly” (without reading the disclosure).219 The 
                                                                                                                      
216 See id. (explaining that during the economic downturn in 2007, many financial in-
stitutions, most notably Lehman Brothers, funded themselves through short-term repo 
markets and at the moment that repo counterparties lost confidence in these banks, they 
were unable to operate). 
217 See Richard Swedberg, The Structure of Confidence and the Collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
30A Res. Soc. Org. 71, 86–90 (2010) (describing in detail the negotiations and informa-
tional obstacles during the weekend in which Lehman Brothers collapsed). The time avail-
able for investors to pierce through the complexity of these institutions was too short. 
218 See Thomas Philippon & Vasiliki Skreta, Optimal Interventions in Markets with Ad-
verse Selection 4 (Apr. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.nyfedecon 
omists.org/research/conference/2009/mp1120/Philippon.pdf (describing financial institu-
tions’ forced participation in initial equity injections); Capital Purchase Program, U.S. Dep’t 
Treasury (Dec. 12, 2012, 4:19 PM), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/ 
TARP-Programs/bank-investment-programs/cap/Pages/overview.aspx (describing the capi-
tal purchase program that was part of TARP, in which the government made direct invest-
ments in over 707 financial institutions, including the first nonvoluntary infusion in nine 
major financial institutions). 
219 For a discussion of the complexity of derivative securities and the problems associ-
ated with piercing through that complexity, see Hu, supra note 170, at 1633–50; Schwarcz, 
supra note 169, at 7–17. 
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investors are more likely to rely on the rating agency’s certification sig-
nal if they know that the agency has the requisite skill to pierce through 
the security’s complexity and the right incentive to do a careful analy-
sis.220 In this scenario, the rating agency has something at stake—its 
reputation, or potential legal liability.221 Each investor is also more 
likely to invest blindly if it sees sophisticated investors purchasing the 
security, and it believes that those investors have done an independent 
evaluation without relying on the AAA rating.222 These sophisticated 
investors provide the securities with a second certification, and to the 
extent that other investors know that they have decided to purchase the 
security, that certification acts as a signal. But a sophisticated investor’s 
signal is credible only to the extent that it has the proper incentive to 
do an independent investigation and if it has something at stake, such 
as the loss from purchasing an overvalued security. To summarize and 
provide a concrete context: the complex financial derivatives that 
ended up as toxic assets in the portfolios of financial institutions, pen-
sion funds, and other institutional investors in 2007 had two certifica-
tion signals attached to them—one from the rating agency and another 
from the sophisticated investors purchasing the securities.223 
 Suppose that a financial institution is trying to sell complex deriva-
tives. How would it use these signals to allow a purchaser to determine 
that they were “good” securities? It would get them rated.224 It would 
then sell the AAA-rated portion of the securities to pension plans and 
other institutional investors who are sophisticated. If pension plan A 
sees pension plan B purchasing the securities, it may conclude that 
plan B has done the requisite due diligence; plan A therefore can pur-
chase the securities blindly, without relying solely on the AAA rating 
and without any further investigation.225 The financial institution sell-
ing the securities will sell lower rated tranches of the same securities to 
other sophisticated investors and will keep the lowest rated tranche in 
its own portfolio. A purchaser of the AAA-rated securities now has four 
levels of certification: (1) the AAA rating; (2) other sophisticated inves-
tors purchasing the AAA-rated tranche; (3) the second set of sophisti-
                                                                                                                      
220 See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of rating agency 
certification as a signal to investors). 
221 See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text. 
222 See Banerjee, supra note 179, at 798 (discussing the idea of herding, in which inves-
tors mimic the actions of others instead of relying on their own information). 
223 This assumes that others could observe the purchases of sophisticated investors. 
224 See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text. 
225 See Banerjee, supra note 179, at 798. 
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cated investors purchasing an even riskier version of the same securi-
ties, who have likely done their own independent investigation; and (4) 
the fact that the financial institution selling the securities is keeping the 
riskiest portion of the securities in its own portfolio.226 
 What can go wrong? First, the AAA rating is not a credible certifi-
cation, either because the agency does not understand the complex 
derivatives, or because it has a conflict of interest.227 Second, pension 
plan B does not carry out its own independent assessment, but rather 
relies on the rating and its own observations of pension plan A purchas-
ing the securities; pension plan A does the same thing. Third, the insti-
tutional investors purchasing the middle tranche do not do their own 
due diligence, but instead rely on the signal from the financial institu-
tion selling the securities—that it is keeping the riskiest portion of the 
securities itself. Fourth, as the securities become more complex or buy-
ers begin to believe that they may be overvalued, the financial institu-
tion selling them will need to ramp up its signal by keeping larger and 
larger portions of the riskiest tranche of each of the securities that it 
sells. 
 All of these possibilities turned out to be true with the complex de-
rivatives issued in the period leading to the Great Recession of 2007.228 
The end result: the purchasers of the AAA securities were relying on 
multiple unreliable certification signals, and the purchasers of the mid-
dle tranches also relied on an unreliable signal. Furthermore, the finan-
cial institutions selling the securities ended up with large amounts of 
worthless securities in their portfolios—the toxic assets. Although at first 
glance, it may appear that having two certification signals is better than 
one, this is not necessarily true, given the free rider and potential herd-
ing problems created by multiple certification signals. 
E. Information Loss from the Overuse of Corporate Signals and the Sudden 
Collapse of Companies and Industries 
 The more that companies and investors rely on corporate signals, 
the more likely that important information within disclosure docu-
                                                                                                                      
226 See Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 Eur. Fin. Mgmt. 10, 17–23 (2009) (provid-
ing an extensive overview of the way that asset-backed securities are structured in tranches 
and sold to investors with different risk preferences, and discussing the role played by the 
retention of equity portion by the security’s seller). 
227 For example, if the rating agency fails to give a security a AAA rating, then that fi-
nancial institution will take its business to one of the other rating agencies. 
228 See Gorton, supra note 226, at 30–41 (describing the collapse of the subprime de-
rivatives market in 2007). 
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ments will not get processed and used; investors, at the very least, will 
delay trying to decipher and use the information for trading in the face 
of complex information.229 Over time, this can lead to information loss 
within the whole system. This information loss can be costly, particu-
larly if regulators or investors face real-time constraints and have to 
quickly ascertain the true financial state of a complex company.230 This 
leads to an empirical prediction: the more complex a company and its 
disclosure documents, and thus the more that investors rely on corpo-
rate signals,231 the more likely that a company will experience a sudden 
collapse—a sudden loss of confidence by investors that will lead to a 
mass exit by creditors and a decline in market price. We saw this phe-
nomenon with Enron, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and other fi-
nancial institutions.232 From a dynamic perspective, the greater the 
complexity, the greater the likelihood that companies will go through 
long periods of time in which investors monitor managers relying pri-
marily on corporate signals. This can allow these companies to get even 
bigger and more complex, which in turn will ramp up the investors’ 
incentives to focus on corporate signals. Suppose that, at some point, 
investors lose confidence in the truthfulness or information value of a 
company’s signal. Investors are more likely to exit the market than to 
remain committed to their investments and try to make sense of all the 
information they ignored during the signal-intensive phase. 
IV. Using Securities Laws to Deter the Use of Deceptive 
Signals: The Promise and Limitations of the Approach 
 So far, this Article has argued that managers and companies com-
municate with investors through their oral and written statements, and 
                                                                                                                      
229 See Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. Econ. 
Literature 315, 351–52 (2009) (summarizing empirical studies on investor inattention, 
in the context of complex information, which leads to delays in incorporating newly re-
leased information into a company’s market price). 
230 See Utset, supra note 148, at 806–09 (arguing that the only information that is useful 
to many investors is information with “real-time transparency”). 
231 To measure the amount of reliance on corporate signals, one can look at the mar-
ket reactions to signals, as opposed to annual or quarterly reports. In particular, one can 
look at the level of market reactions to unexpected signals, such as a dividend cut. 
232 See Coffee, supra note 25, at 1404–05 (discussing the loss of investor confidence after 
Enron); Susanne Craig et al., The Weekend That Wall Street Died: Ties That Long United Strongest 
Firms Unraveled as Lehman Brothers Sank Toward Failure, Wall St. J. (Dec. 29, 2008), http:// 
professional.wsj.com/article/SB123051066413538349.html?mg=reno-wsj (discussing the 
collapse of the financial markets, particularly focusing on Lehman Brothers and Bear 
Stearns). 
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through their conduct—corporate signals.233 A rational manager will 
have an incentive to use corporate signals strategically: by engaging in 
message arbitrage, message magnification, and, most importantly, de-
ceptive or fraudulent signaling.234 Part III identified four characteristics 
of federal securities laws that encourage managers to use corporate sig-
nals, instead of verbal statements, when they communicate with inves-
tors.235 When used extensively, even truthful corporate signals can lead 
to stock bubbles, costly signaling racers, and the loss of corporate-
specific and industry-wide information.236 
 Part IV begins by addressing the basic problem of how a lawmaker 
would design legal rules that avoid, or minimize, the types of commu-
nication distortions identified in Parts II and III.237 It then shows that 
deceptive signals are actionable under SEC Rule 10b-5.238 The follow-
ing Section provides a new interpretation of some of the most contro-
versial provisions of SOX, particularly those dealing with corporate 
governance.239 These provisions can be seen as mandatory signaling 
mechanisms that require a particular type of conduct from managers, 
make that conduct public, and penalize managers who fail to act in the 
appropriate manner or make a false disclosure about it.240 Part IV also 
looks at how the Dodd-Frank Act addressed the short-term debt signal-
ing problem described in Part III.241 The last Section raises and answers 
the three principal objections to using federal securities laws to regu-
late deceptive signaling.242 
A. Designing Legal Rules That Properly Deter Fraudulent Messages 
 This Section identifies and analyzes some of the difficulties in cre-
ating a legal rule and enforcement regime that will deter both decep-
tive signals and deceptive verbal statements. It also addresses the four 
                                                                                                                      
233 See supra notes 25–91 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra notes 92–142 and accompanying text. 
235 See supra notes 143–232 and accompanying text. 
236 See supra notes 143–232 and accompanying text. 
237 See infra notes 243–284 and accompanying text. 
238 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012); see infra notes 285–320 and accompanying text. 
239 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 §§ 103, 302–303, 404, 906, 116 Stat. 
745, 755, 777–78, 789, 806 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.A. 
(West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-196)); see infra notes 321–351 and accompanying text. 
240 See infra notes 321–351 and accompanying text. 
241 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); see infra notes 277–
284 and accompanying text. 
242 See infra notes 352–357 and accompanying text. 
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problematic incentives in federal securities laws,243 as well as the short-
term debt signaling problem.244 
1. A Holistic Approach to Securities Fraud 
 Deceptive corporate signals are underenforced, even though de-
ceptive conduct that acts as a communication can violate Rule 10b-5.245 
How would a lawmaker address this underenforcement problem? To 
simplify matters, assume that a manager can compose a fraudulent 
message (“FM”) using either a deceptive signal (“S”) or a deceptive 
verbal disclosure (“V”). If Congress prohibits V only, the manager will 
compose FM using S only, and vice versa. Even if Congress were to pro-
hibit both V and S, it would underdeter the manager if the expected 
sanctions for either V or S were lower than the expected harm pro-
duced by FM.246 For example, if FM produces a loss to investors of $1 
million, then the expected sanctions for V and S have to be at least $1 
million.247 The expected sanction will be diluted if the SEC or private 
parties do not spend enough resources to detect and punish managers 
who send fraudulent messages.248 Consequently, in order to deter a 
                                                                                                                      
 
243 See supra notes 155–196 and accompanying text. 
244 See supra notes 197–228 and accompanying text. 
245 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012); see infra note s285–320 and accompanying text. In ad-
dition to Rule 10b-5, there are other securities law provisions that can potentially be used 
to deter deceptive signaling. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i 
(2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (prohibiting behavior aimed at “creating a false or misleading 
appearance of active trading in any security . . . , or a false or misleading appearance with 
respect to the market for any such security”); id. § 10(b) (prohibiting “any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance” that is used “in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security”); id. § 14(a) (regulating the solicitation of proxies); id. § 14(e) (prohibiting 
“fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender 
offer”); id. § 15(c)(1)(A) (prohibiting broker-dealers from using “any manipulative, de-
ceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance”); id. § 16(a)(1) (requiring officers and 
directors to file statements upon the sale of securities); Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 77k(a) (prohibiting the use of registration statements containing untrue state-
ments of material fact and half-truths). 
246 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 
169, 191–95 (1968) (setting forth a general optimal deterrence approach in which ex-
pected sanctions are set equal to the expected harm of the activity being prohibited). 
247 If the expected sanctions for V or S, or both, fall below $1 million, the manager will 
engage in fraud. A manager will also incur transaction costs using V and S. If these transac-
tion costs are sufficiently high, then one would want to incorporate them into the deter-
rence analysis, by adding that amount to the expected sanctions. If the expected sanctions 
of V and S are $900,000 and the transaction costs for D are $200,000 and for S, only 
$50,000, then the manager will be deterred from using V, but not S. 
248 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions when Individuals Are Im-
perfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension, 21 J. Legal Stud. 365, 366–67 (1992) 
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manager from using FM that can be composed using S, V, or both, a 
lawmaker will have to set the expected sanctions for both S and V high 
enough so that they exceed the expected harm from FM.249 In more 
realistic scenarios, a manager may be able to use multiple signals to 
compose a message; she may have the opportunity to use signals to di-
lute the thrust of a negative verbal statement by engaging in message 
arbitrage.250 Although this will make a lawmaker’s task more difficult, it 
provides additional support to the main normative claim of the Article: 
that in order to deter fraudulent messages properly, a lawmaker must 
pay careful attention to the deceptive signals available to a manager, 
and to the interactions between signals and verbal statements. In short, 
a lawmaker must take a holistic approach to regulating securities fraud. 
2. The Interaction Between Signals and Disclosure Documents: The 
Cross-Checking Issue 
 An investor who is concerned that a corporate signal is deceptive 
may test its veracity by comparing it to information included in the 
company’s SEC filings.251 Suppose that a company’s corporate filings 
are complex and an investor faces significant real-time constraints; this 
can lead an investor to make trading decisions solely based on corpo-
rate signals without reading corporate documents.252 But if an investor 
is sufficiently concerned about whether a signal is deceptive, it may find 
it worthwhile to examine the parts of the filing that are related to the 
                                                                                                                      
(describing the optimal trade-off between higher sanctions and enforcement costs when 
offenders are imperfectly informed of the probability of detection). 
249 This is just an example of a more general problem that arises whenever a principal 
is trying to provide the right incentive to an agent who is expected to perform two or more 
tasks. If the principal provides a higher-powered incentive for one of the tasks, the agent 
will focus on that one first, and, in certain circumstances, may not perform the other tasks 
at all. For example, a law that rewards public schools whose students perform well in stan-
dardized tests will provide the school with an incentive to require its teachers to spend 
more time teaching the subjects that can be tested in a standardized test, at the expense of 
other things, such as how to think creatively, which may be of equal, or possibly greater 
value. See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive 
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 24, 24–29 (1991) (developing 
a theory of the dual-task principal/agent problem). 
250 See supra notes 107–120 and accompanying text (discussing message arbitrage and 
message magnification). 
251 See SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2012) (setting forth the instructions for fil-
ing forms under the 1933 and 1934 Acts). 
252 See supra notes 166–179 and accompanying text (discussing the increased complex-
ity of disclosure requirements and regulations). 
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signal in question.253 This very act of cross-checking can produce a 
positive externality, for it may lead the investor to discover that the sig-
nal, the verbal disclosure, or both, are false, misleading, or incomplete. 
This sort of cross-checking can thus expose fraud, to the extent that the 
investor brings a securities lawsuit or otherwise alerts the SEC, and pro-
vide a positive externality to other investors. This means that the activist 
investor will not capture the full benefits from cross-checking. Because 
of this externality, each investor may reason that it is better off not do-
ing any cross-checking and waiting until others do it—that is, free rid-
ing.254 And, if all investors reason in the same way, no cross-checking 
will occur.255 
 An investor will still have an incentive to cross-check corporate sig-
nals against disclosure documents to the extent that it is able to get a 
sufficiently high return.256 Suppose that cross-checking is a relatively 
simple exercise, as would be the case if investors could quickly discover 
the relevant information in disclosure documents. In order for an in-
vestor to make an arbitrage profit, it will have to act before others do.257 
In this sort of scenario, each investor will conclude that it makes sense 
to invest in cross-checking only if others will not do so.258 If every inves-
tor concludes that others will act, they will each remain passive, but if 
they each remain passive then it is beneficial for at least one to act.259 
This last result is just a variant of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothe-
sis (“ECMH”) paradox.260 But if one combines it with the other argu-
                                                                                                                      
 
253 See supra notes 193–196 and accompanying text (discussing the information that 
companies are required to disclose to the SEC regarding dividends, and how it would be 
instructive for investors to analyze these documents in order to properly decode the signal 
of a dividend payment). 
254 See Terry M. Moe, The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Inter-
nal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups 103–08 (1980) (discussing the role of “po-
litical entrepreneurs” in overcoming collective action problems); Mancur Olson Jr., The 
Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 44–47 (1965) 
(discussing the collective action problem). 
255 See Olson, supra note 254, at 44–47. More generally, whenever an action, A, pro-
duces a positive externality, those who have the ability to do A will have an incentive to free 
ride. See id. If all parties free ride, then A never gets done, and the whole group becomes 
worse off. See id. 
256 If an investor can trade on the information that it discovers, before others have 
cross-checked and exhausted the potential arbitrage profit, then it will. 
257 See Utset, supra note 148, at 806–09 (discussing the problem of real-time transpar-
ency, and the need for investors to decipher information quickly, before other investors 
have done so). 
258 See Olson, supra note 254, at 44–47 (discussing the collective action problem). 
259 See id. 
260 See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Competitive Price Systems, 
66 Am. Econ. Rev. 246, 248, 250–51 (1976) (theorizing that the market is never fully effi-
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ments regarding cross-checking corporate signals against disclosure 
documents, and, by symmetry, disclosure documents against signals, 
one can reach two conclusions that are relevant to a lawmaker who is 
designing legal rules to deter securities fraud. 
 First, cross-checking is valuable for society whenever the expected 
return from discovering a deceptive signal or deceptive disclosure ex-
ceeds the aggregate costs from cross-checking. These costs will increase 
with the complexity of a disclosure document and with the number of 
investors who cross-check. All other things being equal, it would be bet-
ter for society if only one investor cross-checks and reveals the informa-
tion to everyone else. Increasing the number of monitors is beneficial 
whenever the expected return to individual investors is negative, but a 
group of investors can cooperate to share the cross-checking costs. 
There is a second scenario in which it makes sense to have more inves-
tors involved. In order to use the information to make an arbitrage 
profit, an investor has to convince a sufficient number of other inves-
tors that the signal or disclosure is false,261 and the investor must do so 
before it runs out of funds and incurs large losses.262 
 Second, to the extent that a lawmaker wants to encourage cross-
checking, he has to take into account the collective action and real-time 
constraint problems discussed above. Furthermore, if an investor knows 
that a corporate signal is truthful, it will completely ignore disclosure 
documents, at least to the extent that signals provide it with all the in-
formation that it needs to make investment decisions.263 Suppose, for 
                                                                                                                      
cient because if the market was truly efficient then investors would not get a proper return 
on investment, they would stop acquiring information, and the market would then be-
come inefficient again); see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 88, at 622–26 (describing 
the “Efficiency Paradox” identified by economists Sanford Grossman & Joseph Stiglitz). 
261 Two well-known examples in which the prophetic claims of skeptical analysts were 
ignored for long periods of time are (1) the Equity Funding of America collapse discov-
ered by Raymond Dirks, who tipped information to his clients after he failed to convince 
the Wall Street Journal to investigate, and whom the SEC eventually prosecuted for insider 
trading, and (2) the Bernie Madoff affair. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648–50 (1983); 
Office of Investigations, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Investigation of Failure of 
the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme 1–3 (2009), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf. 
262 This problem, known as the limits to arbitrage problem, is one reason that capital 
markets may fail to be efficient. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 
52 J. Fin. 35, 52–54 (1997) (arguing that the ECMH assumes that markets have a large num-
ber of well-diversified traders who take advantage of all arbitrage opportunities, but that, in 
reality, markets have a small number of non-diversified arbitrageurs with limited resources, 
who, due to the risks involved, will leave some valuable arbitrage opportunities unexploited). 
263 Or, an investor may ignore disclosure documents if turning to them for additional 
information will lead it to miss an arbitrage opportunity. 
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the sake of argument, that the expected sanctions for deceptive signals 
were so high that corporate signals were guaranteed to be truthful, and 
that each investor concluded that it could rely solely on corporate sig-
nals. At one extreme, this would make disclosure documents irrelevant. 
At the other, it may be that the information in signals is sufficient to 
meet the requirements of each investor, but that disclosure documents 
have additional information that, if known, would make all investors 
better off. Disclosure documents may, for example, allow someone to 
discover that managers were engaged in large-scale fraud. This is an-
other example of a collective action problem—one caused by a law-
maker solving the deceptive corporate signal problem without taking 
into account the unintended side effects on disclosure documents. 
3. Complexity 
 The complexity issue is the most difficult to deal with. As compa-
nies become more complex, so will their disclosure documents.264 One 
potential approach is to prevent companies from increasing in size and 
from using nontransparent financing arrangements. Although such a 
solution may seem fanciful, it is the one that, at least in theory, Con-
gress adopted in the Dodd-Frank Act.265 One of the principal policy 
goals of the Dodd-Frank Act is reducing the risk that the financial sec-
tor would experience the type of sudden collapse that it did in 2007.266 
The Act does so, in part, by bringing within the regulatory umbrella 
nonbank financial institutions267—a number of which had to be bailed 
out because they were “too big to fail”268—and providing that if an in-
                                                                                                                      
 
264 See supra notes 130–141 and accompanying text (discussing how disclosure docu-
ments have become more complex as companies themselves have become more complex). 
265 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
266 See S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 2 (2010). 
267 Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(1) (defining “bank holding company”); id. § 102(a)(4)(A) 
(defining “foreign nonbank financial company”); id. § 102(a)(4)(D) (defining “nonbank 
financial company supervised by the Board of ,Governors” a determination to be made by 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council); id. § 102(a)(7) (delegating to the Federal Reserve 
Board the authority to define the terms “significant nonbank financial company” and “sig-
nificant bank holding company”). This included subjecting large, complex bank and non-
bank financial institutions to “more stringent capital and liquidity standards.” S. Rep. No. 
111-176, at 3 (summarizing the testimony of Federal Reserve Board chairman Ben Bernanke 
to the Senate Banking Committee on July 22, 2009). 
268 A financial institution is “too big to fail” or “too interconnected to fail” if, when a 
regulator is faced with the choice of letting it fail or bailing it out, the regulator is forced to 
choose the latter because letting it fail could lead to the failure of other institutions or 
instability within the financial system. See Gerald P. Dwyer, Too Big to Fail, Notes from 
Vault (Ctr. Fin. Innovation & Stability, Atlanta, Ga.), Feb. 2010, at 2, available at http:// 
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stitution is in financial trouble, then its investors and managers have to 
bear the costs.269 The U.S. government, in short, cannot bail it out270— 
the institution has to be liquidated.271 
 Nonetheless, because modern corporations and financial arrange-
ments are so complex, a lawmaker faces a dilemma: either it makes the 
company sufficiently transparent, and the disclosure documents highly 
opaque, or it makes the documents transparent by reducing their com-
plexity, and leaves the company opaque to investors. A lawmaker is likely 
to choose the former, meaning that disclosure documents will remain 
complex and corporate signals will have heightened importance as a 
means of communication. 
4. Mandatory, Salient Disclosures of the Conduct of Companies and 
Their Managers 
 One reason that the use of corporate signals has increased is that 
securities laws require extensive disclosure of the conduct of companies 
and their managers.272 A corporate signal is created each time an inves-
tor observes, directly or indirectly, the conduct of a company or its 
managers, and attaches a meaning to it.273 Current mandatory disclo-
sure requirements, therefore, create a large number of signals, al-
                                                                                                                      
www.frbatlanta.org/documents/cenfis/pubscf/nftv_0210.pdf. If financial institutions be-
lieve that the government will bail them out whenever they are sufficiently large and im-
portant to the financial system, they will have an incentive to take more risks than what is 
socially optimal, and to become larger and more interconnected to assure that they fall 
within the group of institutions that cannot be allowed to fail. See id. (explaining how the 
incentives of financial institutions change). To fully avoid this moral hazard problem, regu-
lators have to pre-commit never to bail out financial institutions. 
269 Institutions are more likely to become bigger and more complex if they have easy 
access to financing. To combat this, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (FDIC), when liquidating a financial institution, to ensure that 
shareholders “do not receive payment until after all other claims . . . are fully paid.” Dodd-
Frank Act § 206(2); see also id. § 204(a) (requiring that creditors, shareholders, and man-
agers bear losses, and that these are calibrated so that the losses are borne in a manner 
consistent with the parties’ relative responsibilities). 
270 See id. §§ 1101–1109 (limiting the ability of federal agencies to bail out institutions 
and providing for heightened oversight of agencies’ behavior during financial crises). 
271 Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act gives the FDIC the same type of prompt resolution 
authority over large nonbank financial institutions that it already had vis-à-vis insured de-
posit institutions, and requires the liquidation of failing nonbank institutions. See id. § 210. 
272 See supra notes 133–138 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra notes 35–78 and accompanying text (describing a standard signaling the-
ory). 
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though not all of them are material or deceptive.274 However, in design-
ing legal rules, a lawmaker should pay attention to the interrelationship 
between required disclosures and signals. Moreover, the coupling of 
disclosure and signals does not always lead to a negative result. For ex-
ample, this coupling increases the likelihood that an investor will en-
gage in the type of cross-checking described above.275 And, if used crea-
tively, it can help reduce securities fraud.276 
5. Short-Term Debt Signaling Races and Layered Signals 
 The Dodd-Frank Act includes a number of provisions to regulate 
short-term financing.277 For example, a nonbank financial institution’s 
“degree of reliance on short-term funding”278 will be taken into ac-
count in determining whether it should be subject to enhanced super-
vision by the Federal Reserve.279 Moreover, the Federal Reserve may 
adopt short-term debt limits280 and may limit an institution’s overall 
credit exposure.281 These provisions, however, do not directly address 
the problem raised in Part III: the signaling race between borrowers 
and the incentive of lenders to invest blindly and over-rely on corporate 
signals. But the Act does move away from relying solely on micropru-
dential regulation and moves closer to macroprudential regulation.282 
                                                                                                                      
 
274 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West, Westlaw through P.L. 
112-196)) (requiring a multitude of mandatory disclosures for financial institutions). 
275 See supra notes 251–263 and accompanying text. 
276 See infra notes 321–351 and accompanying text. 
277 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
278 See id. § 113(a)(2)( J). 
279 The Financial Stability Oversight Council will make this determination. Id. §§ 111–
112 (establishing the Financial Stability Oversight Council and setting forth its authority); 
see id. § 113(a)(1) (allowing the Council to vote to require enhanced supervision with the 
Federal Reserve over U.S. nonbank financial institutions). 
280 The goal of these limits would be “to mitigate the risks that an over-accumulation of 
such debt could pose to bank holding companies . . . , nonbank financial companies su-
pervised by the Board of Governors, or the financial system.” Id. § 115(g); see also id. 
§ 165(g)(1) (setting forth the Federal Reserve’s authority to adopt limits to “mitigate the 
risks that an over-accumulation of short-term debt could pose to financial companies and 
to the stability of the United States financial system”). 
281 Id. § 165(e)(2) (limiting credit exposure to unaffiliated companies that exceeds 
twenty-five percent of the capital stock, or a lower limit if the Federal Reserve determines it 
“necessary to mitigate risks to the financial stability of the United States”). 
282 See S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 2–3 (2010) (summarizing the testimony of Treasury sec-
retary Timothy Geithner, Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, FDIC chairman Sheila 
Bair, SEC chairman Mary Schapiro, and Federal Reserve Board governor Daniel Tarullo 
on the importance of adopting a macroprudential approach to financial regulation that 
2013] Fraudulent Corporate Signals: Conduct as Securities Fraud 697 
The authority given to regulators to engage in macroprudential regula-
tion is broad enough to allow them to deal with the signaling race and 
blind investing problems. It also allows them to identify and deal with 
certification283 and other signaling practices used to issue complex se-
curities that can lead to the layered signaling problem.284 
B. Composing Corporate Messages in the Shadow of Rule 10b-5 
 Rule 10b-5 is the most important antifraud provision in the 1934 
Act, and the one that is most likely to be useful in trying to deter 
fraudulent corporate signals.285 Suppose that a company’s CEO knows 
that the company’s common stock, which is listed on a major stock ex-
change, is overvalued by the capital markets. The company has com-
plied with all of its disclosure requirements under the 1934 Act, and, 
notwithstanding its truthful disclosure, the market continues to over-
value the company. This overvaluation can occur either because the 
company is too complex and the required disclosures under the 1934 
Act are not sufficiently detailed to properly value the company, or be-
cause the capital markets are not perfectly efficient.286 
                                                                                                                      
directly addresses the interconnection of large financial firms that may threaten financial 
stability). Microprudential regulation focuses on the financial soundness of institutions 
individually, whereas macroprudential regulation focuses on financial institutions as a 
group—the way they interact, the types of financing arrangements they enter into, and the 
extent to which competitive forces can lead them to undertake too much risk. Samuel G. 
Hanson et al., A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation, 1 (Univ. of Chi. Booth 
Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 10-29, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1708173. 
283 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 939, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (amending a number of legal rules that required 
companies to use rating agencies). 
284 See id. §§ 931–939 (instituting comprehensive regulation of rating agencies); 
§§ 941–946 (adopting new regulations for the securitization process, including disclosure 
and due diligence requirements); supra notes 92–141 and accompanying text (explaining 
the strategic use of signals). 
285 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
286 Traders systematically misinterpret corporate disclosures, and those who have 
properly interpreted them could face a limit to the arbitrage problem. See supra note 262 
and accompanying text (discussing the arbitrage problem). 
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 This type of scenario is more common than was once believed.287 
Suppose the CEO wants to ensure that the market does not discover 
that the company is overvalued, at least for the time being. To accom-
plish this, she decides to increase the dividend paid by the company. 
This increase in corporate distributions is not due to an increase in the 
company’s profits or cash flows; instead, the CEO (as a manager) has to 
dip into cash reserves or borrow funds in order to pay the dividend.288 
The CEO intends for the dividend to deceive investors and expects that 
the market will react positively to the announcement, and the market 
in fact reacts that way. 
 Do the CEO’s actions violate Rule 10b-5 and subject her and the 
company to a private cause of action?289 In order for a plaintiff to sus-
tain a private cause of action, he has to show that: (1) the CEO’s actions 
were deceptive, and the deception was material; (2) the CEO acted 
with the requisite intent or scienter; (3) the plaintiff relied on the de-
ceptive conduct; (4) the deceptive conduct proximately caused the loss 
to the plaintiff; (5) there was an economic loss; and (6) there was the 
requisite loss causation.290 This Article discusses the first three re-
quirements because they are most likely to raise problems in a decep-
tive signaling fraud case. 
1. Deception 
 Section 10(b) prohibits manipulative and deceptive behavior in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.291 The manipulative 
                                                                                                                      
 
287 In a world in which the ECMH is assumed to be an accurate description of the 
working of capital markets, a company cannot be systematically overvalued (or underval-
ued). See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty 
Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. Corp. L. 715, 719 (2003) (setting forth some general 
predictions of the ECMH); Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, 
and Enron, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 394, 417–20 (2004) (discussing limitations to the ECMH 
that were revealed by the sudden collapse of Enron); Richard A. Posner, On the Receipt of the 
Ronald H. Coase Medal: Uncertainty, the Economic Crisis, and the Future of Law and Economics, 12 
Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 265, 278 (2010) (arguing that the financial crisis of 2007 provided a 
challenge to the ECMH). 
288 Although it is the board of directors that has the authority under corporate law to 
declare a dividend, this Article assumes, for the sake of argument, that the CEO and the 
Board are in collusion. The analysis below would be the same if, in fact, the board had 
effective power and made a decision to send a deceptive signal. 
289 See 17 C.F.R. § 140.10b-5. 
290 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 
(2008). 
291 Specifically, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits, “in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security,” the use of “any manipulative or deceptive device or contriv-
ance.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). Rule 10b-5, adopted by the SEC pursuant to section 
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behavior that Congress sought to outlaw involved a set of well-known 
and well-worn trading practices that aimed to inflate (or deflate) the 
price of a company’s security artificially.292 The deceptive behavior that 
it sought to prohibit was communications by corporations, their agents, 
and other market participants that were untrue, misleading, or other-
wise incomplete.293 
 By outlawing this sort of deception, Congress’s principal aim was to 
move away from securities markets in which caveat emptor was the rule, 
and toward markets in which full disclosure was, at least in theory, the 
aspiration.294 It is clear that written and oral statements can be decep-
tive,295 as can silence when the defendant is under a duty to speak.296 
But what is important for our purposes is that conduct, such as a corpo-
rate signal, can violate Rule 10b-5. This was reiterated by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in the 2008 case, Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scien-
tific-Atlanta, Inc., in which it stated that “[c]onduct itself can be 
deceptive,” and rejected the notion that “there must be a specific oral or 
written statement before there could be liability.”297 But not all fraudu-
lent conduct will violate section 10(b), for in order to deceive, a defen-
dant’s conduct has to give “the victim a false impression,”298 which in 
turn requires a sufficient nexus between the defendant’s actions and the 
                                                                                                                      
10(b), sets forth the types of manipulative and deceptive practices that are actionable, 
including making misstatements of material facts and for any statement that is made, omit-
ting a material fact necessary to avoid having a statement be misleading. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 140.10b-5 (2012). 
292 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (stating that the term 
“manipulative” is “virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets,” 
and explaining that it refers to “conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by con-
trolling or artificially affecting the price of securities”). These practices included transac-
tions such as wash sales, matched orders, and rigged prices. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. 
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977). 
293 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14 (stating that temporary insiders, such as lawyers, ac-
countants, and investment bankers, can inherit a fiduciary duty not to trade on inside 
corporate information); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that 
a market participant who possesses nonpublic information, but who does not owe a fiduci-
ary or similar duty to shareholders, can trade without violating section 10(b)). 
294 See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (stating 
that the underlying goal of the 1934 Act was “to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure 
for the philosophy of caveat emptor” (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 
U.S. 180, 186 (1963))). 
295 See Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 471–74. 
296 See Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 153. 
297 Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158. 
298 United States v. Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2008). Written and oral state-
ments (and omissions) also involve “conduct,” but in interpreting them, the communica-
tion’s receiver will look primarily to the words used, and not to the actions of those making 
the statements. See id. at 148–49. 
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victim’s expectations.299 In most cases, this nexus will be established if 
the conduct, as observed and interpreted by the victim, can be deemed 
to send a message: it acts as a form of communication that gives a false 
impression.300 
 A corporate signal can deceive, or give a false impression when it is 
interpreted by investors as a statement about the company, the investors 
believe that statement to be truthful, and the statement is in fact not 
truthful or is misleading.301 In our example, a reasonable investor will 
interpret a decision to increase a company’s dividend as comprising a 
set of plausible statements or claims about the company’s true state of 
affairs: (1) that the company’s profits are increasing; (2) that the com-
pany can afford the dividend; and (3) that the company’s growth op-
portunities have ended, and its management has decided to distribute 
previously retained earnings to shareholders. The first two interpreta-
tions should lead to an increase in the value of the company’s stock, 
whereas the third is more difficult to predict. The third interpretation 
should lead to a decrease in value if investors interpret it as a pure sign 
that the company’s growth has stalled, or an increase if the managers 
are tying their own hands to make it more difficult for them to use the 
excess cash to increase agency costs.302 If the announcement of the 
dividend increase leads to an increase in the company’s market price, 
then the most plausible interpretation is that the market has inter-
                                                                                                                      
299 Compare Finnerty, 533 F.3d at 149 (holding that violating stock exchange rules by it-
self is insufficient to prove securities fraud, even if those trading on the exchange had 
some expectation that market makers would follow rules, and that a more direct connec-
tion is needed), with SEC v. Simpson Capital Mgmt., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 196, 205 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding conduct to be deceptive where “mutual funds were misled into 
thinking that the trades were made before 4 p.m.” when they were actually submitted after 
that time), and In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845, 856 (D. Md. 2005) (hold-
ing that market timing by itself is not illegal, but it is deceptive “if it is engaged in by fa-
vored market insiders at the expense of long-term mutual fund investors from whom it is 
concealed and who have a right to rely upon its prevention by fund advisers’ and manag-
ers’ good faith performance of their fiduciary obligations”). 
300 See Finnerty, 533 F.3d at 149 (concluding that the court did not need to reach the 
question of whether deception under section 10(b) requires “some form of communica-
tion . . . (although that is the template of virtually every case)”). 
301 See Simpson Capital Mgmt., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 205; In re Mut. Funds, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 
856. 
302 See William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 Geo. L.J. 845, 868–69 (2005) 
(describing the agency theory of dividends); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash 
Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 323, 323–24 (1986) (developing a 
free cash flow agency explanation, and distinguishing between managers tying hands via 
debt, which is contractual in nature, and managers issuing dividends, which, unlike inter-
est payments, is a discretionary act). 
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preted the dividend as a positive statement.303 But the company is in 
fact overvalued, so by bidding up the market price in response to the 
dividend, investors are sending the following return statement to the 
CEO: we do not believe that the company is overvalued. As a result, the 
investors have been deceived.304 
2. Scienter 
 Section 10(b) also requires that the defendant acted with sci-
enter—the mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.305 Proving scienter often requires “inference from circumstan-
tial evidence.”306 In our example, the CEO used the dividend increase 
with the intent to deceive investors. A dividend requires approval of the 
board of directors,307 whose meeting minutes may include evidence 
about the CEO’s and the board’s intent.308 Moreover, the company, and 
                                                                                                                      
 
303 If the dividend announcement leads to a decrease in the market price, however, 
then the most plausible interpretation is that investors have interpreted the signal in a 
negative fashion. In other words, investors have interpreted it as a statement that the com-
pany is overvalued, or equivalently, that its future growth prospects are less than the mar-
ket had previously thought. This can be because the market interprets the signal correctly 
as a lie—it sees through the deception. In the latter case, there would be no cause of ac-
tion under section 10(b) because those relying on the signal were not harmed. See Ston-
eridge, 552 U.S. at 157 (stating that there must be an economic loss to satisfy the require-
ments of a claim for securities fraud under section 10(b)). 
304 More precisely, in order to provide this deception, and show that the increase in 
price was due to the dividend, a plaintiff will need to hire an expert to do an event study. 
See Frank Torchio, Proper Event Study Analysis in Securities Litigation, 35 J. Corp. L. 159, 160–
63 (2009) (describing the methodology of an event study). In such a study, the expert will 
compare the historical movements of the company’s market price in order to get a base-
line price. See id. at 162. It will then look at the movement in the company’s market prices 
around the time of the dividend, usually using a three-day window: two days before and 
one day after. See id. Finally, the expert will compare the changes in the price upon the 
announcement of the dividend with the baseline price to see if it in fact was the dividend 
that caused the change in price. See id. The goal of such studies, which are commonly used 
in securities litigation, is to try to ensure that the change in price was not due to some 
other news about the company released around the time of the dividend. See id. at 160. 
Given that, in our example, the manager intends to use the dividend increase to deceive 
the market, he would want to make sure that the dividend increase is as salient as possible, 
so he would not release any other information around the same time. See supra notes 121–
129 and accompanying text (describing a manager’s incentive to make corporate signals 
salient). 
305 See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12, 201. 
306 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390–91 n.30 (1983) (stating that 
“the difficulty of proving the defendant’s state of mind supports a lower standard of proof”). 
307 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 170(a) (2010) (authorizing the board of directors to 
pay dividends). 
308 In some cases, it will be easy to show that a CEO intended to use a dividend or 
other corporate signal to deceive investors, because the executive will leave a paper trail. 
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other companies in the same industry, will have a history of dividend 
payments; a plaintiff will look for discontinuities in that history, as well 
as for tit-for-tat dividends within the industry.309 A company, in addi-
tion, is more likely to pay a dividend if it has the requisite cash and ex-
pects to have sufficient cash flows in the future to meet its obliga-
tions;310 a sudden, unexpected cut in dividends after a period of 
increases can also provide evidence of scienter.311 
3. Reliance 
 Even if the CEO intended to send a deceptive signal and that sig-
nal was material, a plaintiff using a private cause of action under Rule 
10b-5 will still have to show that he relied on the signal.312 Alternatively, 
a plaintiff can meet the requirements to trigger the fraud-on-the-
markets presumption created by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1988 
case, Basic v. Levinson.313 In a class action lawsuit, which is the most 
common way to bring a private action under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff will 
generally be able to rely on the fraud-on-the-markets presumption 
                                                                                                                      
Although it is relatively unlikely that a CEO will do so voluntarily, if she is acting in collu-
sion with the board of directors, it is more likely that such a paper trail will exist. The min-
utes are unlikely to reveal a smoking gun, but they may include other information regard-
ing the company’s current financial state that can help the plaintiff prove scienter, if it is 
evidence that the company would find it difficult to increase the dividend. 
309 See In re Xcel Energy, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1059 (D. Minn. 2003) (stating that 
the plaintiffs in a security fraud case looked to the defendant’s historic payment of divi-
dends to prove that its actions constituted securities fraud, although the plaintiffs were 
unsuccessful in this case). 
310 At first glance, this raises difficulties. If one adopts the standard interpretation of 
the dividend signal, in which a good company tries to separate itself from bad companies 
by declaring dividends in cases in which there is a risk that its future cash flows may not 
materialize, then it is this willingness to take the risk that allows good companies to sepa-
rate themselves. But we are concerned with deceptive signals used by bad companies—
those who do not have the requisite cash flows, or face a substantially high risk that they 
will not have sufficient cash flows in the future. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying 
text (describing standard dividend signaling theories). 
311 A company that has been increasing its dividends repeatedly over a period of time 
and suddenly cuts the dividend without warning is more likely to have been using dividend 
payments to intentionally deceive shareholders. See Efraim Benmelech et al., Stock-Based 
Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives, 125 Q.J. Econ. 1769, 1782–89 (2010) (setting forth a 
theory of the incentives of managers to conceal information by increasing dividends, up to 
the point when they run out of funds and must drastically reduce dividends—an event that 
would increase the likelihood that shareholders will hold managers accountable). 
312 See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
313 485 U.S. 224, 241–42, 247 (1988) (holding that investors rely on market price, 
which encapsulates most publicly available information, when purchasing or selling stock, 
and “an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be 
presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action”). 
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when, as in our example, the security in question is common stock 
listed on a major stock exchange.314 The fraud-on-the-market analysis 
for deceptive signals is essentially the same as for standard misrepresen-
tations and omissions.315 The information embedded in a corporate 
signal will be extracted and interpreted by investors, who will use it to 
revise their valuation of the company’s securities. If they determine that 
the current market price has not yet incorporated this information, 
they will trade on it until the market price reflects it. This is how, ac-
cording to the ECMH, capital markets react whenever companies re-
lease nonpublic information.316 The way that the information is com-
municated should not matter for purposes of the ECMH.317 Finally, to 
meet the reliance requirement,318 a plaintiff has to show that the de-
ceptive signal reached the market.319 A manager engaged in deceptive 
signaling will not only want to make the signal public, but also to make 
it stand out—make it salient.320 
C. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Mandatory Signals With Penalties Attached 
 One way for Congress to take a more holistic approach to regulat-
ing corporate communications is to require managers to act in a cer-
tain way,321 require disclosure of those actions, and penalize managers 
if they fail to act, fail to make the requisite disclosures, or both. This 
approach would consist of a mandatory signaling regime with penalties 
attached. Until SOX, which contained a number of controversial provi-
sions directly regulating the conduct of managers in the area of corpo-
rate governance,322 federal securities laws dealt primarily with disclo-
                                                                                                                      
 
314 See id. at 245. 
315 See id. at 241–42. 
316 See Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 Va. L. 
Rev. 945, 990–91 (1991) (describing how corporate signals would be interpreted by capital 
markets and incorporated into market price under ECMH). 
317 See id. 
318 See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158–59 (stating that in order for deceptive conduct to be 
actionable in a private cause of action, the deceptive conduct must be communicated to 
the public; if it is kept hidden from the market, then it cannot be incorporated into mar-
ket price, and the fraud-on-the-market reliance presumption will not be applicable). 
319 See id. In certain instances, the price may not move because of a countervailing sig-
nal, disclosure, or other extraneous event. 
320 See supra notes 121–129 and accompanying text (arguing that in order for a signal 
to be effective it has to be made public, and that managers sending it will have an incentive 
to make it salient). 
321 The manager’s required action will act as a signal. 
322 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West, Westlaw through P.L. 
112-196)). Commentators have identified a number of problems with SOX. See, e.g., Kate 
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sure issues.323 This Section proposes a new interpretation of some of 
these SOX governance provisions: that they act as an enforceable, 
mandatory signaling regime.324 For such a signaling device to be effec-
tive, it needs to meet two requirements: (1) the expected sanctions for 
sending a deceptive signal are higher than the expected benefits; and 
(2) the gap between the time an actor sends a deceptive signal and the 
time a deception is detected and punished is not too large. 
1. Mandatory Signals with Recursive Monitoring 
 SOX imposes a number of new duties on the CEO and Chief Fi-
nancial Officer (CFO), mandating them to take certain actions and cer-
tify that they have done so.325 Good managers will want to be able to 
send credible signals that they have instituted robust internal con-
trols.326 To help them do this, Congress adopted sections 103, 302, 303, 
                                                                                                                      
 
Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1857, 1897–98 (2007) 
(arguing that SOX had more negative effects than positive effects for investors); Larry E. 
Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, 28 J. Corp. L. 1, 18–19 (2002) (providing an overview of the problems associated 
with the regulatory approach used by SOX); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521, 1585–91 (2005) (arguing that 
SOX was not effective in terms of improving audit quality or benefiting investors, for SOX 
was simply political “window dressing”). 
323 See Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 478–80 (providing the rationale for an opinion based 
on the difference between securities fraud, regulated by federal law, and fiduciary duties 
and other corporate governance matters that Congress has left within the province of indi-
vidual states). 
324 Mandatory signaling devices will help encourage bad companies to exit and move 
to jurisdictions with weaker governance and securities regimes, including those with de-
fault regimes that allow shareholders to opt out. See Anita Indira Anand, An Analysis of 
Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance: Structures Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 31 Del. J. Corp. 
L. 229, 235 (2006) (discussing the differences between mandatory and enabling govern-
ance regimes in an international context). Shareholders are likely to opt out in public 
corporations, given collective action problems. See Olson, supra note 254, at 44–47. 
325 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West, Westlaw through P.L. 
112-196)). 
326 Internal controls help identify existing (and potential) problems, and assure that 
the information needed to meet disclosure requirements is gathered, verified, and trans-
ferred up the ladder to those with the primary responsibility for drafting disclosure docu-
ments—top managers, the board of directors, inside and outside counsel, and auditors. See 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Controls, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 237, 
240–44 (1997). Internal controls are the organizational equivalent to an antivirus program 
that is always running in the background to identify and quarantine viruses and prevent 
unauthorized intrusions into a computer system. As with such an antivirus program, inter-
nal controls need to be monitored and updated to deal with new types of risks. See id. at 
250–55 (arguing that the board of directors should be required to be more proactive in 
creating and monitoring a company’s internal controls). In recent years, Delaware courts 
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404, and 906 of SOX.327 Section 404 requires companies to prepare an 
“internal control report” to be included in their annual reports,328 stat-
ing “the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining 
an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial re-
porting.”329 The report must also “contain an assessment . . . of the ef-
fectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer 
for financial reporting,”330 as well as an assessment of this assessment, 
performed by the company’s auditors, who must “report on” the man-
agers’ assessment and attest that the managers in fact carried it out.331 
 This is an example of a monitor—the managers—forced to engage 
in monitoring and of a second monitor forced to monitor the first 
monitor. This double-monitoring scenario is more effective than one 
may at first think. Some may argue that the second monitor—the audi-
tors—must themselves be monitored, and they are because they are 
subject to liability.332 But what makes this monitoring scheme effective 
is its recursive nature: if the auditors fail to meet their duties under sec-
tion 404(b), and the managers fail to catch the auditors’ failure, the 
managers would themselves violate section 404(a).333 This sort of recur-
sive monitoring has not received any real attention from commenta-
tors, but it is a simple solution to the problem of a principal having one 
agent monitor a second agent.334 
 The recursive monitoring features of section 404 run even 
deeper.335 Section 302(a)(4) requires a company’s CEO and CFO to 
                                                                                                                      
have significantly enhanced the internal control requirements of corporations. See Stone v. 
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 371–72 (Del. 2006) (discussing what constitutes a reasonable system 
of internal controls); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (emphasizing a director’s duty to oversee the company’s internal controls). 
327 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103 (auditing, quality control, and independence standards); 
id. § 302 (corporate responsibility for financial reports); id. § 303 (improperly influencing 
audits); id. § 404 (management assessment of internal controls); id. § 906 (corporate offi-
cers failing to certify financial reports); see Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After 
Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems,” 31 J. Corp. 
L. 949, 957–64 (2006) (providing an overview of SOX’s internal control mechanisms). 
328 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404(a), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
329 Id. § 404(a)(1). 
330 Id. § 404(a)(2). 
331 Id. § 404(b). 
332 Id. 
333 Id. §§ 404(a), 404(b). 
334 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 
39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 850–52 (1992) (discussing the problems and potential solutions with 
having one agent monitoring a second agent, given the inherent conflicts and informa-
tional asymmetries within principal agency relationships). 
335 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
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certify in each annual and quarterly report that they: (1) “are responsi-
ble for establishing and maintaining internal controls”;336 (2) have de-
signed them to “ensure that material information relating to the issuer 
and its consolidated subsidiaries is made known” to them;337 (3) have 
carried out the evaluation needed to comply with section 404(a) and 
included their conclusions in the annual report;338 and (4) have dis-
closed any “significant changes in internal controls” —anything that 
could significantly affect them in the future—and any “corrective ac-
tions” that were necessary.339 
 During their evaluation, the CEO and CFO may discover material 
“deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which 
could adversely affect” the production, recording, and flow of financial 
information and other “material weaknesses” in the controls. They may 
discover fraud by those who have “a significant role in the issuer’s in-
ternal controls.”340 If they discover either, they have to disclose this to 
the auditors, the board of directors, and the audit committee.341 And 
they must certify that they have done so.342 A company’s audit commit-
tee is also required, under section 301, to “establish procedures for the 
receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the issuer 
regarding . . . internal accounting controls.”343 SOX also requires that 
the CEO and CFO certify any periodic report that contains financial 
statements, including quarterly reports and reports filed pursuant to 
Form 8-K, that the report “fairly presents, in all material respects, the 
financial condition and results of operations” of the company.344 
 The recursive structure of the auditor’s obligations under section 
404 is further amplified by section 103(a)(2)(A)(iii), which requires 
auditors to report “the scope of [their] testing of the internal control 
                                                                                                                      
336 Id. § 302(a)(4)(A). 
337 Id. § 302(a)(4)(B). 
338 See id. § 302(a)(4)(C)–(D). 
339 Id. § 302(a)(6). Section 302 also applies to quarterly reports and requires the CEO 
and CFO to evaluate the effectiveness of the internal control no more than ninety days 
before the filing and to disclose their findings in the filing. Id. § 302(a)(4). 
340 See id. § 302(a)(5). 
341 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(5) (2006). 
342 Id. 
343 Id. § 301(c)(4). Members of a company’s audit committee must also have “experi-
ence with internal accounting controls.” Id. § 407(b)(3). 
344 Id. § 906(b). Violating this certification requirement is punishable with a fine of $1 
million and prison sentence of no more than ten years. Id. § 906(c)(1). A willful violation 
is punishable by a fine of up to $5 million, and a prison sentence of up to twenty years. Id. 
§ 906(c)(2). 
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structure and procedures of the issuer, required by section 404(b).”345 
The structure is also amplified by section 303, which prohibits managers 
from trying to “fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead” 
an auditor so as to make financial statements misleading.346 And law-
yers, who will be involved in drafting disclosures and helping managers 
meet the requirements of sections 302 and 404, are themselves subject 
to heightened standards.347 Section 307 requires that a company’s law-
yer report to the chief legal counsel or the CEO any “evidence of a ma-
terial violation of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or similar 
violation by the company” or any of its agents, and if neither of them 
takes the required remedial actions, the lawyer must report the evidence 
to the board or an appropriate committee of the board.348 
2. The Limitations of SOX’s Mandatory Signaling Mechanisms 
 A good manager will want to be able to separate herself from bad 
managers immediately after she incurs the signaling cost. But in many 
instances, a bad manager is able and willing to incur the signaling costs 
for a period of time, hoping that she will be able to turn things around 
and avoid having anyone ever find out that she was sending misleading 
signals.349 A signaling mechanism that requires an actor to incur a sig-
naling cost at time t, but does not penalize deceptive signals until some-
time in the future—t + n—will allow bad actors to pool themselves with 
good ones by sending deceptive signals during the n periods in be-
tween. Many civil penalties and criminal sanctions have this delay be-
tween when a bad act is committed and when it is discovered and pun-
ished.350 Because the mandatory signaling mechanisms in SOX are 
enforced with delayed sanctions, they are susceptible to pooling during 
the intermediate periods.351 
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347 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006). 
348 Id. 
349 See supra notes 35–44 and accompanying text. 
350 For example, in the case against Enron’s former CEO Jeffrey Skilling, the defen-
dant engaged in a conspiracy to fraudulently inflate the company’s financial state to inves-
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2896, 2907–08 (2010). 
351 See 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (2006) (establishing that those corporate officers found 
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D. Possible Objections 
 This Section raises and addresses three possible objections against 
using securities laws to regulate deceptive corporate signals. 
1. The Over-Regulation Objection: The Distinction Between Deceptive 
and Fraudulent Signals 
 Given the nature of corporate signaling, one would expect that, at 
any one time, a large number of companies are engaged in deceptive 
signaling. To the extent that it engages in signaling, a bad company will 
almost always make use of deceptive signals; its goal, after all, is to get 
investors to believe, albeit incorrectly, that it is a good company. But 
suppose that a large number of companies were committing fraud in 
their oral and written statements; what would Congress and the SEC 
do? Historically, their reaction to the revelation of widespread fraud has 
been to adopt more stringent rules.352 The mere fact that deceptive 
signaling is widespread, by itself, is not a valid objection. The real posi-
tive issue is the following: to what extent do deceptive verbal and non-
verbal communications harm investors? The real normative issue is the 
following: how much should society spend in dealing with the problem 
of fraudulent communications? 
2. The Multiple Interpretation Objection 
 Corporate signals are often open to multiple interpretations.353 At 
first glance it may appear that the open texture, and possible multiple 
interpretations of corporate signals, will make it excessively difficult for 
a court to determine whether a signal was truthful or deceptive, and 
whether there was the requisite intent to deceive. But markets, led by 
sophisticated investors seeking arbitrage opportunities, attach meaning 
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more than 20 years, or both”). 
352 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 901–991, 
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to corporate signals in the same way that they attach meanings to other 
corporate statements.354 
 Additionally, even when a signal is open to multiple interpreta-
tions, it is possible to pigeonhole it either as positive or negative. A ra-
tional manager, for example, rarely has a reason to send a negative sig-
nal, and if the action that resulted in the signal is outside the manager’s 
control, then a positive signal is more likely to be a harbinger of good 
news, and a negative one a harbinger of bad news. Investors and courts 
may be able to further refine their interpretation of vague signals by 
using other available information. They may cross-check against disclo-
sure documents, and take into account the company’s history with re-
gard to a signal, as well as the history of its competitors. 
3. The “Sticky” Signal Objection 
 As a general matter, once a signal has created a salient reference 
point, moving away from it will lead to a larger than usual negative re-
action by capital markets.355 For example, once a company starts paying 
a dividend, it is unlikely to stop paying it, and even when the company 
experiences changes that call for a change in the dividend, the com-
pany will be hesitant to adjust the dividend immediately.356 The com-
pany is also more likely to increase its dividend than to reduce it. As a 
result, a manager will have an incentive to delay cutting back a dividend 
as long as she can; delaying makes sense because the negative reaction 
from any cut will be large, and there is some likelihood that during the 
delay the company’s fortune will change, making it unnecessary to cut 
the dividend. 
 A similar argument applies to other signals, such as the use of 
short-term debt and collateral. In order for a manager to benefit from 
these two signals, these signals have to be made salient to the target au-
dience—the shareholders.357 But this very salience, which is needed to 
get the message across, helps cement expectations. If these expecta-
tions are later undermined by a change in the signal, such as moving 
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from short-term to long-term debt, or no longer pledging collateral, 
the shareholders’ negative reaction will be magnified. 
 If a signal is sticky, a manager’s failure to change the signal creates 
certain ambiguity about whether, by her inaction, she intended to de-
ceive investors. But it is possible to use other information to determine 
the manager’s state of mind. For example, if the company’s financial 
position had changed significantly, such that continuing to pay a divi-
dend would create a material long-term loss to the company, then a 
manager likely intended to deceive investors and make them believe 
that the company’s prospects had not changed. 
Conclusion 
 This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of corporate 
signals as actions of a manager or corporation observed by an investor, 
who attaches meaning to them, and uses them in deciding how to trade 
or vote and in testing the veracity of other corporate information. More 
generally, the Article provides an integrated analysis of corporate 
communications, broadly construed, as information transferred from 
managers or corporations to investors using verbal disclosures that are 
subject to federal securities laws, and corporate signals. This in-depth 
analysis identifies a deep connection between the use of corporate sig-
nals—both truthful and deceptive—and recent changes in securities 
laws. 
 The Article also reveals how a lawmaker would go about designing 
antifraud provisions under the securities laws if his goal is to reduce 
total fraud, and not simply to rechannel deceptive practices from the 
realm of written and oral statements to that of deceptive corporate sig-
nals. Corporate signaling, in all its guises, creates a number of social 
costs that commentators and policymakers have failed to take into ac-
count. By providing a careful analysis of the practice of deceptive sig-
naling and of its relationship to current securities laws, to stock market 
bubbles, and to destabilizing signaling races, the Article helps bring the 
general problem to the foreground. By providing a sketch of a holistic 
or integrated approach to the regulation of securities fraud, the Article 
helps set the framework for further analysis, empirical testing, and 
more concrete policy recommendations. 
